

**Displacement Versus Co-existence in Human-wildlife Conflict Zones: An  
Overview**

**Abstract**

Wildlife presents both a threat and a resource to humans. Protected areas offer the best protection for conserving biodiversity and ecosystems worldwide. Despite more than half protected areas around the world being established on indigenous land natives are generally prohibited official access. However, protected areas are suffering from encroachment of surrounding population and almost half of all protected areas are heavily used for agriculture. Those in the tropics especially are experiencing serious and increasing degradation from poor management of development projects, agricultural encroachment, and illegal resource use. As a result, human-wildlife conflict is a significant and growing problem around the world. The literature reviewed for this paper has been notable for its polarised assessment of the human-wildlife conflict. On one side are the biological sciences, devoted to understanding the mechanisms of biodiversity loss and its consequences for conservation. On the other side are the social scientists, concerned with livelihood issues in and outside protected areas. Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau claim that these two groups have had an unequal influence on policy, with biological sciences having devoted a “broader, deeper and more systematic research effort than the social sciences” (2003, 3). To avoid some of the bias towards biological sciences present in the literature, this paper will examine the underlying conditions required for co-existence. As such, I developed the ‘human-wildlife interaction model’.

**Key words:** Human-wildlife conflict, human settlement, displacement, Resettlement, livelihood, co-existence

**1. Introduction**

Protected areas offer the best protection for conserving biodiversity and ecosystems worldwide. They already comprise over 3% of the Earth’s land surface (Brandon and Wells, 1992) and there is both a desire and need to extend this further (Cernea and

35 Schmidt-Soltau, 2003). The IUCN defines a protected area to be broadly “land and/or  
36 sea especially dedicated to the protection of biological diversity, and of natural and  
37 associated cultural resources” (1994, 7), which are further sub-categorised into six  
38 types of protected area according to their objectives. Categories I and II are managed  
39 for science, wilderness protection, ecosystem protection or recreation, and exclude  
40 habitation. About 30% of the total protected area land falls into these categories and  
41 has most likely required eviction of the population during their creation. The  
42 remaining 70% may have some level of human habitation in co-existence with  
43 wildlife (Brockington and Schmidt-Soltau, 2004).

44         Yellowstone National Park, established in 1872 in the United States, was the  
45 world’s first protected area and became the model for park planning worldwide  
46 (Brandon and Wells, 1992). The park was created for the benefit of tourism, to whom  
47 the “natives were seen as an unfortunate blight” (Poirier and Ostergren, 2002, 333).  
48 Consequently, the park was cleared of indigenous occupants who were confined to  
49 Indian reserves. This top-down approach of order and discipline was implemented  
50 through a policy of eviction, fences and fines (Brandon and Wells, 1992). Since then,  
51 over ten million people have been displaced globally by conservation projects, often  
52 causing increased poverty (Schmidt-Soltau, 2005). Concern about the impact on  
53 human welfare has led to a new paradigm for protected areas by including projects  
54 with social and economic objectives and involving local people (Thomas and  
55 Middleton, 2003). State representatives agreed at the IV World Congress on National  
56 Parks and Protected Areas that protected areas should aim to reduce and in way  
57 exacerbate poverty (Brockington and Schmidt-Soltau, 2004), and as such should no  
58 longer be “islands in a sea of development” (IUCN, 1994, 1). The Zaire Resolution on  
59 the Protection of Traditional Ways of Life in 1975 was the first resolution calling for  
60 governments not to displace indigenous people, and has been followed by the UN  
61 Conference on Environment and Development which emphasised the management by  
62 indigenous communities (Poirier and Ostergren, 2002). The new paradigm has led to  
63 calls from some social scientists for forced displacement to no longer be a mainstream  
64 conservation strategy (Schmidt-Soltau, 2005). This has met with some success, for  
65 example in Colombia in the late 1980s, where half its rainforest was assigned to  
66 indigenous inhabitants (Redford and Stearman, 1993).

67         Welfare issues are particularly important because many poorer countries have  
68 set aside a greater share of their land than developed countries, for example the U.S.

69 (4%) compares unfavourably to Botswana (15%) and Costa Rica (12%) (Weber and  
70 Rabinowitz, 1996). Similarly, in the future many additional protected areas will be in  
71 developing countries, for example the Central African sub-region plan to classify 30%  
72 of landmass as protected areas in the next decade, increased from 13% in 2001  
73 (Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau, 2003). Despite more than half protected areas around the  
74 world being established on indigenous land (Oviedo, 2005), displaced natives are  
75 generally prohibited official access (Poirier and Ostergren, 2002). However, protected  
76 areas are suffering from encroachment of surrounding population (Brandon and  
77 Wells, 1992) and almost half of all protected areas are heavily used for agriculture  
78 (Scherr, 2005). Those in the tropics especially are experiencing serious and increasing  
79 degradation from poor management of development projects, agricultural  
80 encroachment, and illegal resource use (Poirier and Ostergren, 2002). As a result,  
81 human-wildlife conflict is a significant and growing problem around the world  
82 (Nyhus et al., 2005).

83 The literature reviewed for this paper has been notable for its polarised  
84 assessment of the human-wildlife conflict. On one side are the biological sciences,  
85 devoted to understanding the mechanisms of biodiversity loss and its consequences  
86 for conservation. On the other side are the social scientists, concerned with livelihood  
87 issues in and outside protected areas. Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau claim that these two  
88 groups have had an unequal influence on policy, with biological sciences having  
89 devoted a “broader, deeper and more systematic research effort than the social  
90 sciences” (2003, 3). This diagnosis can be explained by two factors. Firstly, the  
91 benefits of conservation are perceived to be shared globally which generates funding  
92 from the developed world. In contrast, social development issues are predominantly  
93 grounded in poorer developing countries (Brandon and Wells, 1992). Secondly, the  
94 inhabitants of protected areas are sometimes regarded as relics of the past because of  
95 their lifestyle and tendency to be in remote areas (Poirier and Ostergren, 2002).  
96 Conservation initiatives provide an excuse for the state to resettle and incorporate  
97 them into the market economy (Redford and Stearman, 1993).

98 To avoid some of the bias towards biological sciences present in the literature,  
99 this paper will examine the underlying conditions required for co-existence. As such,  
100 this author has developed the ‘human-wildlife interaction model’.

101

102 **2. Human-wildlife interaction model**

103

104 The fundamental principal of the human-wildlife interaction model is to break down  
105 co-existence inside or near protected areas into three dimensions: pressure for human-  
106 wildlife interaction when they are exposed to each other, level of exposure that  
107 occurs, and potential for interaction to become conflict. The objective of the model is  
108 to understand the extent of wildlife reduction due to conflict with humans, in a  
109 particular circumstance ('determinants of interaction' in the model). Each dimension  
110 is inter-related and evolves over time. Conflict can therefore be reduced by a  
111 reduction in any of the dimensions. This results in three sustainable practices in a  
112 protected area, namely: wildlife depletion (reduced pressure), separation of people  
113 (reduced exposure), and co-existence (reduced conflict). Protected area planning and  
114 management have several options to influence each dimension to achieve sustainable  
115 practice. In the specific case where a protected area encompasses an endangered  
116 species, the analysis is the same except the species will be more sensitive to conflict  
117 than normal. This paper first examines the factors that influence each dimension  
118 ('determinants of interaction'), and assesses the effectiveness of management options  
119 in meeting the goals of protected areas.

120

### 121 **2.1 wildlife depletion (reduced pressure), separation of people (reduced** 122 **exposure), and co-existence (reduced conflict).**

123 Wildlife presents both a threat and a resource to humans. Large carnivores, such as  
124 jaguars, can pose a threat to both human life and livestock. However, human activities  
125 often exasperate the threat, such as poaching of prey and jaguars becoming injured by  
126 rancher shooting. There may also be pressure for people to hunt wildlife for local use  
127 or trade, for example, tigers are in demand in high income parts of Asia for use in  
128 traditional medicines (Weber and Rabinowitz, 1996). Another resource extraction is  
129 local gathering of products, which alters the ecosystem and may reduce habitat. For  
130 example, in the Annapurna Conservation Area in Nepal, people have deforested  
131 land to provide fuel for cooking and heating for the ecotourism trade (Brandon and  
132 Wells, 1992). Extending agriculture or grazing similarly requires clearance of habitat  
133 and has auxiliary effects such as water pollution and fragmentation of wildlife  
134 populations (Scherr, 2005).

135

136 There are two primary considerations for determining the level of human exposure to  
137 wildlife: population density and population distribution. Low population density  
138 results in low levels of human-wildlife exposure, such as in hunter-gather  
139 communities, for example in Central Africa where the habitat is harvested sustainably  
140 for local use as a common pool resource (Nelson and Gami, 2002). However, virtually  
141 all indigenous groups are now linked into the market economy through cash or  
142 bartering, which opens the possibility of increased pressure to satisfy the external  
143 market and in turn may stimulate population growth (Redford and Stearman, 1993).  
144 The importance of population distribution has been examined through media reports  
145 of tiger attacks in Sumatra by Nyhus and Tilson (1994). Where there is a 'hard edge'  
146 boundary that separates people from habitat, such as a river or effective forestry guard  
147 enforcement, there was little probability of interaction even if tigers were relatively  
148 abundant. Where people access multiple use forests there were several cases of  
149 conflict, but the greatest number of incidents occurred where human settlements were  
150 isolated within habitat. Distribution and choice of livelihood is also important in  
151 influencing exposure. For example, in Venezuela, herders can avoid exposure to the  
152 Andean bear by moving their livestock down the mountain closer to their village  
153 (Goldstein et al., 2006). Alternatively, switching to agriculture would remove this  
154 exposure entirely.

155  
156 The potential that humans will turn to conflict to resolve an interaction depends on the  
157 social and economic drivers of behaviour. Most decisions to cause conflict with  
158 ecosystems or individual species are based on rational economics. Rural people living  
159 alongside a protected area are often the poor and displaced and may have few options  
160 other than exploiting wildlife products or expanding the agricultural frontier into the  
161 park (Brandon and Wells, 1992). Similarly, when livestock owners lose cattle to the  
162 Andean bear they protect their herds by hunting and killing bears until the losses stop  
163 (Goldstein et al., 2006). Threats to livelihood and especially human life, may generate  
164 a disproportionate human response in fear or revenge. For example, the jaguar is often  
165 blamed for livestock losses without justification, and persecuted as a result (Weber  
166 and Rabinowitz, 1996). In contrast, some indigenous cultures have beliefs that  
167 encourage the preservation of the ecosystem despite wildlife pressure. For example,  
168 the Coconucos and Yanaconas of Colombia believe the Purace National Park is the

169 dominion of the spirit being, Jucas, and therefore help protect the park (Redford and  
170 Stearman, 1993).

171

172

### 173 **3. Sustainable practices**

174

#### 175 **3.1 Displacement, resettlement and co-existence**

176

177 Historically, governments have used economic incentives to accelerate the  
178 extermination of dangerous animals, such as bounties on the wolf in the U.S. resulting  
179 in elimination from 97% of its range (Weber and Rabinowitz, 1996). While bounties  
180 are no longer offered, elimination of specific problem animals by protected area  
181 authorities may prevent escalation to culls by the affected community. This approach  
182 is being attempted in Ecuador and Bolivia to reduce conflict between the Andean bear  
183 and livestock owners (Goldstein et al., 2006). Wildlife depletion may be an acceptable  
184 solution in specific regions of protected areas, but cannot be the dominant practice in  
185 protected areas. The other determinant of pressure identified in section 2 is external  
186 market demand. In the case of wildlife products this can be addressed through  
187 regulation or trade bans, such as CITES. However, these measures are outside the  
188 authority available to protected area managers.

189

190 Resettlement has been the dominant historical method for reducing interaction  
191 between humans and wildlife. However, as it is currently practiced, involuntary  
192 displacement increases poverty of both indigenous people and their new hosts (Cernea  
193 and Schmidt-Soltau, 2003) and is therefore inconsistent with the aims of protected  
194 areas agreed at the IV World Congress on National Parks and Protected Areas (IUCN,  
195 1994). Cernea's model of 'Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction' lays out the  
196 social impacts of displacement and has been exemplified with analysis from Central  
197 Africa. Involuntary displacement results in a 70-90% loss of land, loss of stumpage  
198 value typically several times greater than GNP per capita, and loss of common  
199 property. There is a loss of income, subsistence and difficulty entering the market  
200 economy. For example when displaced from hunting and gathering, people loss 67%  
201 of cash income that was previously provided by the rainforest. Homelessness and  
202 food insecurity can occur immediately following relocation. In the long-term, social

203 relationships are disrupted, resulting in social disarticulation and marginalisation in  
204 culturally distinct communities. These factors lead to increased morbidity and  
205 mortality (Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau, 2004).

206 Resettlement may also have unintended or indirect impacts on the  
207 conservation of the protected area. Infield et al. (2008) have detailed the social  
208 impacts of the creation of Lake Mburo National Park in Uganda in 1983, which  
209 encompasses important populations of plains game and bird species. As part of the  
210 park creation, the indigenous Bahima pastoralists were forcibly evicted without  
211 compensation. To the Bahima, the land is devoid of meaning unless it is being grazed.  
212 This belief prompted active resistance in which the Bahima reinstated themselves in  
213 60% of the park in 1986. Where the Bahima have remained absent from the park,  
214 there is now significant bush encroachment which reduces grazing for the plains game  
215 the park is there to protect. This transition toward climax species may be due to the  
216 loss of active management of the landscape by grazing and burning in the valleys.  
217 More generally, displacement is likely to alienate people against the goals of  
218 conservation and reduces the incentive for sustainable extract for those able to  
219 illegally access it from outside. For example, displaced hunters in Gabon now re-enter  
220 protected areas to more intensively hunt to supply the market economy (Cernea and  
221 Schmidt-Soltau, 2004).

222 Social consequences of displacement can be largely avoided where  
223 appropriate compensation exists to create voluntary relocation. Estimates for such  
224 compensation in the rainforest are \$20-30 thousand per person (Brockington and  
225 Schmidt-Soltau, 2004) which is considered impractically high by some government  
226 officials (Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau, 2004). Creating buffer zones with low-level  
227 exploitation around human habitation offers a cheaper alternative to resettlement  
228 while still reducing human exposure to wildlife. In practice these are ineffective as  
229 they still reduce livelihood and as such are likely to be open to the same adverse  
230 social reactions as resettlement (Brandon and Wells, 1992).

231

232 Co-existence is a more complex sustainable practice to achieve than 'wildlife  
233 depletion' and 'separation of people', because interaction between wildlife and  
234 humans still remains. The essence of this approach is to prevent interaction from  
235 becoming conflict by rebalancing rational financial decisions and educating to prevent  
236 fear and revenge, where necessary. Projects that focus on rebalancing financials to

237 “link the conservation of biological diversity in protected areas with local social and  
238 economic development” are referred to as ‘Integrated Conservation-Development  
239 Projects’ (ICDPs) (Brandon and Wells, 1992, 557). While ICDPs can still include  
240 management of ‘wildlife depletion’ and ‘separation of people’, they primarily focus  
241 on co-existence. ICDPs attempt to break the reliance on exploiting protected area  
242 resources by offering compensation, providing substitutes or providing alternative  
243 sources of income. This is in exchange for locals relinquishing rights and respecting  
244 conservation goals.

245 Nyhus et al. (2005) have considered the effectiveness of compensation  
246 schemes which reimburse families who have suffered loss of assets, injury or death  
247 due to wildlife. In theory, this reduces the financial need to cull problem animals and  
248 provides an opportunity to discuss conflict prevention, although there is little  
249 quantitative evidence for this. In practice the payment process is also complicated to  
250 manage. Verifying that the damage is due to a particular predator may not be easy; if  
251 the classification scheme is too lenient compensation is open to abuse, if too strict it  
252 cannot be relied upon by the victim and will not change behaviour. Payments also  
253 need to be timely to prevent revenge and transparent to prevent corruption. Where  
254 payments are effective, there may be negative behavioural changes as people lack  
255 incentive to reduce interaction; a situation known as ‘moral hazard’. Compensation  
256 has proved to be successful in the case of wolf reintroduction into Yellowstone  
257 National Park, as it shifted financial burden away from ranchers to conservationists.  
258 This costs as average payment of \$260 per animal killed plus additional management  
259 overheads, including that of trained biologists for verification, which poses a  
260 significant financial upkeep that may not be affordable in cases where there is greater  
261 interaction. Substitutes can be another viable option to reduce resource exploitation,  
262 but are only possible where a direct alternative exists, such as setting up woodlots  
263 outside park boundaries to discourage fuelwood gathering. Indirect forms of  
264 compensation such as community services have also been attempted, but since they  
265 are not directly linked to conservation goals, they suffer from a dispersal of local  
266 goodwill over time (Brandon and Wells, 1992).

267 Alternative sources of income are available from two sources: ecotourism and  
268 ecosystem performance payments. Ecotourism can convey significant income to local  
269 people, for example in Chitwan National Park in Nepal communities get 50% of \$0.7  
270 million annually. Benefits that do occur will likely be unequal within the community



271 and biased towards men who can act as guides or local elites (Brandon and Wells,  
272 1992). However, tourism is not viable across all landscapes (Dinerstein et al., 2007),  
273 and in Africa most of the time revenue does not even cover the costs of tourist  
274 infrastructure (Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau, 2003). The infrastructure can also bring its  
275 own environmental problems as noted earlier in the case of deforestation in  
276 Annapurna Conservation Area (Brandon and Wells, 1992). Ecosystem performance  
277 payments would be conditional on meet wildlife abundance or ecosystem services  
278 targets. For example, in Sweden, Sami reindeer herders are paid for each wolverine  
279 den present on their land. Performance payments rely upon community social pressure  
280 for enforcement and, unlike compensation payments, do not suffer from moral hazard.  
281 However, appropriate verification and payment systems are still necessary. Ecosystem  
282 performance has the added complication of allocating the payment appropriately  
283 amongst community members (Nyhus et al., 2005).

284         Where indigenous beliefs or management systems encourage the preservation  
285 of habitat, it may be possible to ‘piggyback’ specific conservation strategies within  
286 the culture to initiate community conservation. For example, in Rwanda, local farmers  
287 value the mountain habitat for controlling their watershed, which can be linked to  
288 preservation of the mountain gorilla population with appropriate education (Brandon  
289 and Wells, 1992). This can be offered in combination with land rights and political  
290 freedom for cultural survival (Redford and Stearman, 1993). Interweaving  
291 conservation into local culture may have the additional advantage of being self-  
292 enforcing in unstable, war-torn areas where compensation or enforcement would be  
293 difficult (Nelson and Gami, 2002). However, expecting indigenous people to retain  
294 traditional sustainable practices is also to deny them the right to develop and  
295 participate in the modern world. Indigenous groups are non-uniform and there may  
296 already be a rift forming between the elders and young who have experienced  
297 ‘western’ education. The opportunities of the modern world seem unlikely to be  
298 resisted indefinitely (Redford and Stearman, 1993).

299  
300

#### 301 **4. Discussion**

302

303 Brandon and Wells (1992) have considered why, in practice, few ICDP schemes have  
304 managed to successfully link development to conservation management. The

305 underlying reason for wildlife threats may be extremely complicated. For example, at  
306 Khao Yai in Thailand, brokers controlling village lending would take the villager's  
307 land if extortionate repayments were not met. Those who were indebted were then  
308 forced into clearing a new plot in the park to make a livelihood. This situation was  
309 further reinforced by a high external urban demand for fuelwood and construction  
310 material. Participation in conservation schemes helps to identify the local needs, but  
311 these are likely to be more concerned with development than conservation and as such  
312 may raise unrealistic expectations. Similarly, merely replacing the income previously  
313 generated by undesired extraction is not sufficient to cause extraction to desist. People  
314 will attempt to maximise their income, so any excess labour available will still  
315 undertake resource exploitation, which is especially the case where locals act as  
316 guides for an ecotourist trade that is often seasonal. Where incentives are tied directly  
317 to conservation it is difficult to assess the correct level of funding. Too little funding  
318 won't be sufficient to change behaviour, but too great may cause migration into the  
319 region which further increases the human-wildlife interaction and consequently  
320 increases funding requirements. These above practical complications mean that ICDP  
321 schemes are most applicable in situations where there is a link between conservation  
322 and development, the threats to resources are direct and simple, and appropriate  
323 alternatives and technology are available.

324 Limited budgets mean there is a need for protected areas to deliver value for  
325 money. This means implementing the cheapest management option that satisfies the  
326 project's conservation and development goals. In all cases, some level of enforcement  
327 is also necessary, but not sufficient unless the needs of local people are also met  
328 (Brandon and Wells, 1992). Where there is significant interaction due to high wildlife  
329 pressure and exposure, preventing conflict in a state of co-existence will be expensive.  
330 Furthermore, Weber and Radinowitz (1996) consider that for many cases large  
331 carnivores it is not possible at all. Resettlement cost will mostly depend on the  
332 number of people (Brockington and Schmidt-Soltau, 2004), rather than the form of  
333 wildlife, and so is suited to areas with high wildlife pressure (Nyhus et al., 2005).  
334 Displacement must be performed in a way so as not to increase poverty, both to  
335 comply with international agreements (IUCN, 1994) and to avoid a backlash against  
336 conservation. However, there needs to be improved political will, legal frameworks  
337 and institutional capacity to achieve this (Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau, 2003).  
338 Complying with international agreements will make resettlement more expensive than

339 it is currently, which may in turn spur greater consideration of co-existence ICDP  
340 strategies.

341 Co-existence is both possible and financially preferable in some cases where  
342 there is low pressure or pre-existing low exposure. Low pressure occurs in the case of  
343 many grazing animals, birds and plants where there is less threat from wildlife or low  
344 financial benefit from hunting. Low exposure would already be present in the case of  
345 some indigenous populations which have low population densities and for whom  
346 conservation objectives might be aligned with religious beliefs (Brandon and Wells,  
347 1992). In reality, protected areas are often sufficiently large that regions within them  
348 will have different pressures and exposures. It is this author's opinion that they would  
349 therefore benefit from a mosaic of management techniques tailored to each region,  
350 including local wildlife depletion, separation of people and co-existence. This  
351 approach may be challenging where the dominant stakeholder, often an international  
352 NGO (Schmidt-Soltau, 2005), has an approach polarised towards either conservation  
353 (leading to displacement) or development (leading to co-existence).

354

## 355 **5. Conclusions**

356

357 Protected areas are crucial for global conservation of ecosystems and endangered  
358 species, yet while the world is the beneficiary, local people pay the cost through  
359 displacement and deprivation of resources. The human welfare advantages of co-  
360 existence have been recognised by international agreements, but due to a history of  
361 displacement strategies, co-existence has limited practical or theoretical experience.  
362 To conduct a more thorough assessment of the conditions required for co-existence in  
363 protected areas, this author has developed the 'human-wildlife interaction model'.  
364 This model de-constructs the problem by breaking down human-wildlife conflict into  
365 pressure for interaction, human exposure and potential for interaction to become  
366 conflict. Conflict can be reduced by minimising each of the three dimensions, which  
367 successfully predicts the three possible management options: wildlife depletion,  
368 separation of people and co-existence.

369 Co-existence management strategies require human welfare to be linked to  
370 conservation goals, which is not always possible, especially where the links are  
371 particularly complex. Displacement may be a more cost-effective approach in cases  
372 where pressure for interaction is high, such as with large carnivores that pose a threat

373 to human life and livelihood. However, where either pressure or pre-existing exposure  
374 is low, co-existence is likely to offer a cost-effective and viable management option.  
375 Examples of such situations include protected areas to protect grazing animals, birds  
376 or plants, and where indigenous communities live in low densities or have strong  
377 cultural values of preservation.

378

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