

Local Governance in Vietnam

Abstract: *This study examines which configurations explain the outcomes of local government reform and its variable conditions through comparative qualitative analysis (QCA). The research is represented for the analysis of sub-system conditions through a case of Vietnam in public administration reform. Generally the results show the minimum configurations of key variable conditions to achieve the outcomes of local government reform. Public governance conditions affect public administration reform, and the outcomes of local government reform are based on a number of variables including participation at local levels, transparency, vertical accountability, control of corruption in the public sector, public administrative procedures, public service delivery.*

Keywords: Local governance, public administration reform, QCA method, reform in Vietnam.

1. Introduction

In the literature, local government reform refers to particular reform of institutions and entities provided by specified legal documents such as constitutions, ordinary legislation or executive order for the purpose of delivering a range of public services to a relatively small geographically delineated area (Shah A, 2006) [1]. Local government reform is a key factor for ensuring the effectiveness of decentralization in order to achieve good governance in Vietnam (Phan L. H, 2012) [2]. In a long period of time, local governments in Vietnam faced with many issues such as: bulky system, and unclear distribution of affairs and responsibilities, lack of the high-qualified staffs, facilities and revenue (ibib). Currently, PAR implementation produced some positive outcomes and impact to change as outcomes of local government reform. However the level of outcomes of local government reform is varied by localities. It suggests to a particular research to identify and compare the outcomes of local government reform in Vietnam.

The research paper is represented for the empirical analysis of configuration conditions of local government reforms under these five dimensions related to public administration reforms (PAR) through the case study of Vietnam. Where the citizens are considered at the heart of Viet Nam's development and 'end-users' of public administration and public services, they are fully capable of assessing the performance of the State and local authorities, and supporting the State in establishing a State that is "of the people, by the people and for the people" with a typical political-administrative regime.

Choosing the research methods to interpret and explain the configuration of the variable conditions is not easy. We explored on the quantitative methods, for example the linear regression can be appropriate, but the quantitative data is not available not allow to apply the methods. To address the research problem, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is geared towards systematic cross-case comparison, is more appropriate method to tackle this research question. The QCA approach was chosen because this method allows a combination of case and variable-based comparisons for the comparative analysis. The QCA approach allows to

compare systematically a “small N” of cases within 18 chosen provinces. Specifically the csQCA technique allows to test the configuration of condition variables, so this is unique in csQCA method. By this method, we can exploit the epistemological case based knowledge and comparative logic and causal mechanism allows the identification of more than one unique path to an outcome with more than one combination of conditions may account for a result (*see Rihoux, 2008, De Meur and Rihoux 2009, Rihoux, IlonaRezsöhazi, Damien Bol2011*)[3,4,5].

Although QCA is a new approach, many research used the QCA for the public administration and public policy analysis. RihouxB. and Rezsöhazi I. and BOL D. (2011) [5] and Fischer M. &Maggetti M. (2016) [6], Hai Do (2008, 2012, 2015) [7, 8, 9, 10] provides a first systematic review of the connection betweenpublic policy analysis and QCATECHNIQUES,with an emphasis on the state-of-the-art in QCA empirical applications (<http://www.compasss.org/index.htm>). The QCA is a strictly qualitative method (Rihoux 2008, Hai Do 2015) [7, 10], actually QCA can bridges the analysis of qualitative and quantitative data in a situation where cases are too few for conventional statistical techniques and too many for an in-depth case analysis.

This paper is divided into 05 sessions. The 2nd session will discuss about case specification, why we chose the Vietnam’s case, how data are collected for the analysis and how we selected 16 provinces with positive and negative outcome of local government reform to put them into analysis. The 3rd session will specify the model. The 4th session will provide the models analyses. The 5th session will provide the syntheses of the analyses.

1. Case specification

Vietnam is an ASEAN country classified as an authoritarian system under the transitional process with an application of public administration reform. Its reform has changed in economy as well as administration within the broad framework of a move towards ‘a market-oriented economy with a socialist orientation’ in order to participate into the process of globalization, international community support plays as a key factor to the development. More than past 15 years, Vietnam had carried out Public Administration Reform (PAR) with the main goal: *“be successfully building a democratic, strong, clean, professionalized, modernized, effective and efficient public administration system which operates in line with the principles of the socialist ruled-by-law State under the leadership of the Party; the contingent of cadres, civil servants will have appropriate capacities and ethical qualities able to respond to the requirements of the national building and development”*. Firstly PAR master program in the phase 2001 to 2010 in Vietnam consists of: 9 objectives, 4 contents, 5 solutions and 7 work plans. The results of implementation of PAR are to make a great change in public administration from traditional public administration with centralization, bureaucracy and ineffectiveness to the administrative pattern with decentralization, dynamic modernization and effectiveness. However, weaknesses and shortcomings of implementation of PAR shown in the first phase 2001 to 2010 in organizing Government machinery, building public administration institutional, reforming public finance and specially, developing quality of cadres, civil servants, who play a decided role in implementation of PAR (Ngo, 2013) [11]. Working toward to 2020, 2nd phase of PAR Master Program to 2020 with objectives focused on: *“Reforming institution; building, improving the quality of cadres, civil servants, public servants, focus of interest on reform of salary policy in order to motivate cadres, civil servants, public servants to do their tasks with*

high quality and effectiveness; improving the quality of public administration service and public service". The quality of government and policy system is influenced by the public administration reform, Painter M (2005) specified that "the analysis of the wider public administration reform agenda showed the significance of themes and doctrines that related problems on the ground to wider themes of evolving Party doctrine" [12].

The data of research used the results of Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) from 2009-2016 technically supported by UNDP and PAR index to express the outcomes of local government reform and performance of local authorities in addressing the peoples' needs. The research focused on the outcomes of the local government reforms, and its configuration conditions. We selected the provinces with the positive outcome of local government reform are QuangNinh, HaiPhong, ThuaThien Hue, Da Nang, Binh Duong, Dong Nai, Dong Thap, Can Tho while we also chose the provinces with negative outcome of local government reform are Ha Giang, Cao Bang, BacKan, Dien Bien, Lai Chau, Hung Yen, QuangNgai, Kon Tum.

The PAPI is a policy monitoring tool that reflects citizens' experiences with governance, public administration, and public service delivery in Viet Nam. Using data collected from PAPI in a period of 2011-2016 measuring Citizens' Experiences as a result of a joint work among Centre for Community Support and Development Studies, Centre for Research and Training of the Viet Nam Fatherland Front and United Nations Development Program. The research also used the secondary PAR index data from independent source considered to measure the level of outcomes of local government reform.

2. Model specification

It specified that "It is for a local authority to determine its own guidance. It is or should be local government. The case for local government is best made by a local authority that builds initiatives and innovates through close contact and interactions with its citizens and communities in ways that are impossible for central government." (G. Jones et J. Stewart, 2012) [14], so local government reform becomes important phenomenon for the studies in the period of time. Local government reforms originated from the new public management, the local governance has been formulated and encouraged by a conceptual New Public Management (Hood 1991) [15] and this discussion of nature and problems were responded by the conception of public administration reform (Pollite and Bouckaert 2003, 2004, 2011) [15, 16, 18, 18] focused on the welfare state, including its local government dimension by reducing functions and by privatizing as many tasks as could be taken over by the market and the production and public administration reform was considered as strategic decision making which are interacted by three systems of political system and public administration and law and market economy (Pollite and Bouckaert 2004 pp 183-189) [16]. The outcomes of these reforms are to focus on the results-based management to replace the hierarchical control explained by six dimensions of local governance reforms used such as citizen participation at local levels, transparency in local decision-making, vertical accountability towards citizens, control of corruption in the public sector, public administrative procedures, public service delivery.

We can see the citizen participation is critical to developing and strengthening democracy. The local government is democratic by being accountable and responsive to and representative of

its constituency (Beetham1996) [19]. Off course, the central role of public administration is to sustain citizen support of democracy (Ariely 2014) [20]. Beside that the concept of local democracy has been constructed in the context of an institutionalized model of local government [21]. Also, the concept of “public participation encompasses varied opportunities for citizens, nongovernmental organizations, businesses, and others outside the federal government to contribute to and comment on proposed rules” (Cary Coglianese, 2008) [22].

Within the research’s scope, we narrowed down the citizens' participation in local governance is an important objective of local government operation. Citizen participation is to focus on to be informed of citizens' needs, and to meet citizens' needs and to ensure citizens’ influence on the locality’s future and to develop mutual trust between citizens and the local government and to attract support for local activities and investments; and too increase citizens' involvement in the policy implementation including the developmental projects (Do P.H., 2015) [10].

There is a close connection between government reform and transparency in local decision making. The transparency has been ongoing research in multi-dimensional fields including political and social and public administration. “Transparency are technical and legal issues at some levels, but also interactive to produce government that is legitimate, effective, and widely supported by citizens, as well as a civil society that is strong, open, and capable of playing a positive role in politics and government” [24]. In the context of public policy, transparency refers to the openness and accountability of governments, particularly regarding expenditure and decision-making (Tara L, 2010) [25, 26]. “The concepts of ‘transparency’ and ‘evidence of what works’ are key features in the implementation and success of the open public service policy” [27] While the ‘transparency’ can influence reform in some ways (Hale, 2008). In some scholars, government innovation has improved trust in Korean governments under transparency condition (ByongSeob Kim, 2009) [28]. However, in this research, the ‘transparency’ refers to public access to information held by government rule makers as well as information about their decision making. Both transparency and public participation can promote democratic legitimacy by strengthening the connections between government agencies and the public they serve (Do P.H., 2014) [9]. Thus, transparency helps ensure meaningful and informed public participation, and meaningful and informed public participation informs agency rule makers (Coglianese C., 2008) [22].

Based on these premises, we assume that the outcomes of local government reform are shaped and influenced by configurations of these conditions, in particular in terms of participation at local levels, transparency, vertical accountability, control of corruption in the public sector, public administrative procedures, public service delivery following the model developed as follows:

a. Outcome variable (outcomes of local government reform – LOGOV)

Vietnam can utilize decentralization as an alternative measure for removing the remnants of centralization (Phan H. 2012). The outcomes of local government reform became important phenomenon in PAR in Vietnam in the context of decentralization. Accordance to PAR evaluation, the outcomes of local government reform in Vietnam measured by public administration reform index (so-called PAR Index) consists of 8 specific outcomes that reflected local PAR functions including PAR management and administrative procedure

reform, reform of state administration apparatus, building and improving the quality of the team (officials, public servants, civil servants), innovation of management mechanism for public administration agencies and public service delivery units, modernization of state administration; development and dissemination of legal papers at localities, and implementation of One-Stop-Shop and Inter-Agency One-Stop-Shop.

Accordingly, the 8 outcomes of LOGOV measured by 117 indicators, also the PAR Index scoring are a combination of internal evaluation of administrative agency and external evaluation of society. Due to level of complexity and existence of unquantifiable elements in the PAR process, PAR index included outcomes and impact evaluation. Data monitoring are also used as secondary information with a support of primary social survey. It brings more accountability for administrative agencies with external actors' participation.

Following QCA conventions, the outcome variable **LOGOV** received the value=1 if the 'level of outcomes of local government reform is positive; on the opposite, the outcome variable receives the value=0 if it is negative.

b. Defining condition variables

Condition 1: Participation at Local Levels (PARLL)

The participatory governance have taken root at local and sub-local levels and concludes that despite reforms intended to engage local citizens more in local government activity (Aulich, 2009). In Vietnam, participation in political, social, and economic life is the constitutional right of all Vietnamese citizens from the age of 18. Such participation is important in order for citizens to exercise their democratic rights and to do their part to help improve local governance. In this condition variable, the 'Participation at Local Levels' measures how aware citizens are of their right to political participation and how the government facilitates the exercise of this right in elections and local decision-making. It includes civic knowledge, opportunity for participation, quality of village elections. The civic knowledge looks at what citizens know about elections and term limits of elected representatives. The opportunities for participation feature citizens' personal experiences with elections of representatives to the National Assembly and People's Councils at local levels, and of village heads. It also shows how active local governments are in facilitating citizen political participation. Respondents were asked if they personally voted in the National Assembly and People's Council elections, and in village head elections. The quality of village elections assessed by indicators measuring citizens' free choice of candidates, the way the elections are conducted to ensure fair selection and transparency, and whether winners are properly announced to the public. The voluntary contribution is voluntary, instead of forced, contributions to buildings community infrastructure such as cultural houses, roads, or schools – is a form of active citizen participation. Once citizens contribute voluntarily, they tend to participate more actively in different project processes, from participatory to oversight roles, for example voluntary contributions were monitored by Community Investment Supervision Boards and People's Inspection Boards.

Following QCA conventions, the **PARLL** variable can receive the value=1 if it is higher than the threshold; on the opposite, this variable can receive the value=0 if it is fallen below the

threshold. There is a very strong theoretical or empirical reason to locate the threshold between 5.36 and 5.51. From operation, we accepted the threshold at 5.24 in practice.

Condition 2: Transparency (TRANS)

Transparency is a key element of any reform process and transparency refers to the openness and accountability of governments, particularly regarding expenditure and decision-making (Tara L, 2010). It is mentioned in different local government operation including the rule making process (Coglianese, 2008) the public service delivery (Buchanan, 2008; Arvidson, 2014) [28, 25]. This condition variable measures how local governments facilitate and respond to civic rights to better understand how public policies affect citizens' lives and livelihoods. Transparency look at three areas of 'poverty lists' known as lists of poor households, 'commune budget and expenditure lists', and 'local land use planning and pricing'. Information relating to the three areas is required to be transparent and made publicly available so that citizens across the country can exercise their legitimate rights to know, to discuss, to do, and to verify, as stipulated by Grassroots Democracy Ordinance in Vietnam. Transparency in listsof poor households measures the share of citizens who are aware of the publication of lists of poor households in their commune during the year, and reflects how citizens view the quality of these poor household listings. Transparency in commune budgets, knowing how commune budgets are used is an important part of keeping local public officials in check and preventing the diversion of public funds for private use. It reveals the level of transparency in commune budgets and expenditures, an important requirement of the Grassroots Democracy Ordinance which states that communes must ensure citizens' rights to know. Transparency of local land use planning and land compensation frameworks measuring transparency in land use planning and compensation helps to encourage local governments to publicize local land use plans and land compensation schemes in compliance to Grassroots Democracy Ordinance and Land Law.

Following QCA conventions, the **TRANS** variable can receive the value=1 if it is higher than the threshold; on the opposite, this variable can receive the value=0 if it is fallen below the threshold. There is a very strong theoretical or empirical reason to locate the threshold between 5.37 and 5.6. From operation, we accepted the threshold at 5.48 in practice.

Condition 3: Vertical Accountability (VERAC)

Improving government accountability improves service delivery, particularly for the poor (Yilmaz S 2008) [31], also the civil society and citizen groups can hold the state accountable for using the budget as planned and preventing financial leakage (Friis-Hansen E. 2013) [32]. This condition variable was constructed based on three areas to measure how local governments respond to citizen proposals, denunciations, complaints, and/or petitions help to measure how the Law on Denunciations, Law on Complaints, and Law on Citizen Reception are implemented in practice: (i) the frequency and effectiveness of citizen interactions with local authorities (ii) the pro-activeness of local governments in response to citizen proposals or complaints, and (iii) the coverage and effectiveness of People's Inspection Boards. Vertical accountability of local authorities focus on the frequency and effectiveness of interactions between citizens and local authorities as provided for in Law on Citizen Reception. These interactions are through ad-hoc inquiries to village heads, periodical meetings with

public officials from commune People's Committees or mass organizations, and/or voter meetings with commune People's Council members. Response to citizen action focuses on the frequency of citizen proposals, denunciations, complaints, or petitions and how local governments respond to these citizen actions. It shows the pro-activeness of local governments in being accountable to their citizens and the effects of the Law on Denunciation and the Law on Complaints. People's Inspection Boards measure the coverage and effectiveness, a grassroots mechanism made up of elected officials that aims to keep local public officials accountable to citizens.

Following QCA conventions, the **VERAC** variable can receive the value=1 if it is higher than the threshold; on the opposite, this variable can receive the value=0 if it is fallen below the threshold. There is a very strong theoretical or empirical reason to locate the threshold between 5.04 and 5.25. From operation, we accepted the threshold at 5.11 in practice.

Condition 4: Control of Corruption in the Public Sector (CONCO)

Reform is important instrument to control corruption in Asian countries (Bowornwathana 2007) [33]. The condition variable of 'Control of Corruption' is represented by four variables: (i) limitation on public sector corruption (ii) limitation on corruption in public service delivery (iii) equity in state employment, and (iv) willingness to fight corruption. It measures the performance of institutions and local governments in controlling corruption in the public sector. It also shows the tolerance of corruption practices and the willingness to curb corruption by both local governments and citizens. The analysis of above control of corruption systemically embedded corrupt practices such as: firstly, limitation on public sector corruption is measured by information (i) no diversion of public funds by officials (ii) no bribes for land titles (iii) no kickbacks for construction permits. They reflect whether citizens witness or experience these forms of corrupt practices in everyday interactions with local governments. Secondly, limitation on corruption in public service delivery is measured by the level of corruption perceived and experienced by citizens when using public health care and primary schools. Citizens are asked about bribes at public district hospitals and bribes for teachers' favoritism at public primary schools. Thirdly, the equity in state employment equity in state employment contributes significantly to a strong and clean (non-corrupt) state apparatus. From time to time, it seems difficult to reach this goal, especially when personal relationships and informal payments still play an important role among those who wish to pursue careers in the public sector. This has recently been recognized as a danger to an effective and facilitating government by the Government of Viet Nam, with the Prime Minister requesting dismissal of any bureaucrat whose appointment was influenced by nepotism. Fourthly, the willingness to fight corruption reveals the willingness and efforts from both local governments and citizens in combating corruption in their localities.

Following QCA conventions, the **CONCO** variable can receive the value=1 if it is higher than the threshold; on the opposite, this variable can receive the value=0 if it is fallen below the threshold. There is a very strong theoretical or empirical reason to locate the threshold between 5.52 and 5.93. From operation, we accepted the threshold at 5.91 in practice.

Condition 5: Public Administrative Procedures (PUAPR)

Public administrative procedure is a key element for reform (Baner J, 2007) [34]. This condition variable looks at the quality of public administrative services in areas important to citizens. It includes certification services as well as application procedures for construction permits, LURCs, and personal documents. It looks at how professional and responsive public administrative services are. Firstly, public certification services measure provincial performance in providing certification services to citizens at district and commune levels. Secondly, the application procedures for construction permits measure the performance of local governments in granting construction permits for civil construction projects. The application procedures for land use rights certificates (LURCs) measure provincial performance in the provision of LURCs for citizens and the quality of LURC-related public administrative services. It covers application procedures for new LURCs, LURC renewals, and transferring of LURCs at provincial, district, and commune levels. Thirdly, the application procedures for personal documents at commune level is measured by the performance of commune-level People's Committees in addressing applications for different types of personal documents.

Following QCA conventions, the **PUAPR** variable can receive the value=1 if it is higher than the threshold; on the opposite, this variable can receive the value=0 if it is fallen below the threshold. There is a very strong theoretical or empirical reason to locate the threshold between 7.02 and 7.23. From operation, we accepted the threshold at 7.15 in practice.

Condition 6: Public Service Delivery (PUBSE)

This variable condition of 'Public Service Delivery' looks at four public services: health care, primary education, basic infrastructure, and residential law and order. Citizens were asked about their direct experience with the accessibility, quality, and availability of these above services and comparable over time. Firstly, public health care measures the performance of public district hospitals and the quality of public health insurance from a user perspective and how public policies in health care for children under age 6 and health insurance for poor households are being implemented. Secondly, the public primary education constructs this sub-dimension are the total quality of primary schools, the distance from home to school, and the length of time in minutes required for children to travel to school. Thirdly, the basic infrastructure with basic infrastructure provided by local governments is captured in this dimension, including access to electricity, quality of roads nearest houses, frequency of solid waste collection in residential areas, and quality of drinking water. Fourthly, the law and order reflect the level of safety experienced by citizens in everyday life including experienced in safety levels in localities, changes in safety levels, and crime rates in localities such as vehicle theft, robbery, break-ins, and physical violence.

Following QCA conventions, the **PUPSE** variable can receive the value=1 if it is higher than the threshold; on the opposite, this variable can receive the value=0 if it is fallen below the threshold. There is a very strong theoretical or empirical reason to locate the threshold between 6.79 and 7.15. From operation, we accepted the threshold at 6.86 in practice.

Table 1 : Specification of model

	Variables	Coded
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Outcome variable	Local government reform measured by public administration reform index	LOGOV
06 Condition variables	Participation at local level	PARLL
	Transparency	TRANS
	Vertical accountability	VERAC
	Control of corruption in the public sector	CONCO
	Public administrative procedures	PUAPR
	Public service delivery	PUBSE

Table 2: Raw data

ID	PARLL	TRANS	VERAC	CONCO	PUAPR	PUBSE	OUTCOME
Ha Giang	5.34	5.27	4.4	5.82	6.64	6.48	0
Cao Bang	5.21	5.5	4.44	5.53	7.02	6.63	0
Bac Kan	5.35	5.45	5.05	5.9	7.19	6.68	0
Dien Bien	5.55	6.05	4.76	6.18	7.13	6.79	0
Lai Chau	5.09	5.37	4.33	5.4	7.23	6.46	0
Quang Ninh	4.86	4.94	4.92	4.89	6.94	6.42	1
Hai Phong	4.93	5.41	5.3	4.8	7.3	7.81	1
Hung Yen	6.02	5.92	5.28	5.73	7.15	7.38	0
Thua Thien-Hue	5.1	5.14	5.24	5.61	6.75	7.49	1
Da Nang	5.27	6.02	5.82	6.1	7.34	8.03	1
Quang Ngai	5.34	5.89	5.97	5.74	7.44	6.42	0
Kon Tum	5.19	5.15	5.41	5.37	6.8	6.88	0
Binh Duong	4.47	5.28	4.45	4.31	6.95	7.13	1
Dong Nai	5.03	5.65	4.24	5.91	7.18	6.85	1
Dong Thap	5.28	5.6	5.47	6.77	7.66	7.09	1
Can Tho	5.79	5.94	5.69	7.14	7.41	7.6	1

(Data source: <http://papi.org.vn/eng/>)

3. Models analysis

The data are processed with the TOSMANA software, a specialized tool to analyze cross-case regularities in Small- and Intermediate-N Analysis. In Cronqvist (2005) [35], Rihoux (2006, 2008, 2011), Rihoux and Ragin (2008) by means of Boolean algebra, dichotomized variables can be processed which results in a formula explaining the outcome by a combination of condition variables [3]. We chose csQCA instead of mvQCA or fsQCA because we are looking for major analytical contrasts & also strive to achieve strong parsimony through the analysis.

The truth table with five crisp-set (i.e., dichotomous) in causal conditions which were hypothesized as condition variables which set a configuration to the possible outcome in a formulation of social policies demonstrated through 16 cases represented for local government reform in Vietnam. In terms of data analysis, across these cases, under PAPI survey translated into Boolean variables with expected multiple conjunctural forms of causality linking the five conditions and the outcome variable.

The csQCA produces the minimal configurations of conditions for the outcome using algorithm “MultiValueTopDown” on Boolean algebra. These cases are observed in reality were minimized using the algorithm based on Boolean algebra. The configurations governing the patterns were simplified, under those configurations that were theoretically possible but which were not fully observed in 16 these cases (so-called ‘logical cases’) were included in the minimization. In principle, the inclusion of logical cases generalized the explanatory patterns that are suggested by the observed cases. In the analysis, with five dichotomous causal conditions, there are theoretically $2^6 (2^k) = 64$ possible combinations of conditions.

Minimization of “local government reform” outcome

On the Boolean Minimization, the TOSMANA software used the material to produce table 3 below with 13 below configurations: 4 configurations with [1] outcome corresponding to 7 cases; 9 configuration with [0] outcome with remain 9 cases. As recommended in a good practice (Rihoux and de Meur, 2008, pp.33-66, Hai D.H. et al 2015), we run the minimization procedure twice, first for the [1] configurations, and then for the [0] configurations.

**Table 3: Truth table of Boolean Configurations with five causal conditions
& “local government reform” outcome**

ID	PARLL	TRANS	VERAC	CONCO	PUAPR	PUBSE	LOGOV
Ha Giang	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cao Bang	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
BacKan	1	0	0	1	1	0	0
Dien Bien	1	1	0	1	0	0	0
Lai Chau	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
QuangNinh	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HaiPhong	0	0	1	0	1	1	1

Hung Yen	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
ThuaThien-Hue,Kon Tum	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
Da Nang,DongThap,CanTho	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
QuangNgai	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Binh Duong	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Dong Nai	0	1	0	1	1	0	1

Minimizing value the [1] Configurations (Without Logical Remainders)

TOSMANA software minimize the [1] configurations without including non-observed cases (without logical remainders). In the Boolean minimization, the reduction of configurations given by truth table above reveals a clear pattern of the outcome for the ‘equal and fair society’ of social policies.

We obtain the following minimal formula shown below:

PARLL{0} * TRANS{0} * VERAC{1} * CONCO{0} * PUAPR{1} * PUBSE{1} +	PARLL{1} * TRANS{1} * VERAC{1} * CONCO{1} * PUAPR{1} * PUBSE{1} +	PARLL{0} * TRANS{0} * VERAC{0} * CONCO{0} * PUAPR{0} * PUBSE{1} +	PARLL{0} * TRANS{1} * VERAC{0} * CONCO{1} * PUAPR{1} * PUBSE{0}
(HaiPhong)	(Da Nang,DongThap,CanTho)	(Binh Duong)	(Dong Nai)

We can select one formula represented for the analysis as follows (Formula 1):

$PARLL\{1\} * TRANS\{1\} * VERAC\{1\} * CONCO\{1\} * PUAPR\{1\} * PUBSE\{1\} \rightarrow$ good local government reform.

From formula 1, we can see 6 provinces gathering in the 04 configurations. Three of them are typical cases of (HaiPhong) or (Binh Duong) or (Dong Nai) . The formula is quite complex, so only small measure of parsimony has been achieved. First glance, there are important configuration of six conditions in cases of (Da Nang,DongThap,CanTho) produced the positive outcome ‘good local government reform’.

Minimizing value the [0] Configurations (Without Logical Remainders)

Secondly, TOSMANA software running with the same procedure, this time for the [0] configurations and also without including some non-observed cases (the remainders are excluded) the result as follows:

PARLL{1} * TRANS{0} *	PARLL{1} * TRANS{0} *	PARLL{0} * VERAC{0} *	PARLL{0} * TRANS{0} *	PARLL{1} * TRANS{0} *	PARLL{0} * TRANS{0} *	PARLL{1} * TRANS{0} *
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VERAC{0} * CONCO{1} * PUBSE{0} +	VERAC{0} }* CONCO{1} }* PUAPR{0} }* PUBSE{0}	CONCO{0} * PUAPR{0} * PUBSE{0} +	VERAC{0} * CONCO{0} * PUBSE{0} +	TRANS{1} }* VERAC{1} }* CONCO{1} }* PUAPR{0} }* PUBSE{1} }* +	TRANS{0} }* VERAC{1} }* CONCO{0} }* PUAPR{0} }* PUBSE{1} }* +	TRANS{1} }* VERAC{1} }* CONCO{1} }* PUAPR{1} }* PUBSE{0}
(Ha Giang+BacKan)	(Ha Giang+Di en Bien)	(Cao Bang+QuangNin h)	(Lai Chau+QuangNin h)	(Hung Yen)	(ThuaThie n-Hue,Kon Tum)	(QuangNgai)

We can re-write as follows (formula 2):

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{PARLL}\{1\} * \text{TRANS}\{0\} * \text{VERAC}\{0\} * \text{CONCO}\{1\} * \text{PUBSE}\{0\} + \text{PARLL}\{1\} * \\ & \text{VERAC}\{0\} * \text{CONCO}\{1\} * \text{PUAPR}\{0\} * \text{PUBSE}\{0\} + \text{PARLL}\{0\} * \text{VERAC}\{0\} * \\ & \text{CONCO}\{0\} * \text{PUAPR}\{0\} * \text{PUBSE}\{0\} + \text{PARLL}\{0\} * \text{TRANS}\{0\} * \text{VERAC}\{0\} * \\ & \text{CONCO}\{0\} * \text{PUBSE}\{0\} + \text{PARLL}\{1\} * \text{TRANS}\{1\} * \text{VERAC}\{1\} * \text{CONCO}\{1\} * \\ & \text{PUAPR}\{0\} * \text{PUBSE}\{1\} + \text{PARLL}\{0\} * \text{TRANS}\{0\} * \text{VERAC}\{1\} * \text{CONCO}\{0\} * \\ & \text{PUAPR}\{0\} * \text{PUBSE}\{1\} + \text{PARLL}\{1\} * \text{TRANS}\{1\} * \text{VERAC}\{1\} * \text{CONCO}\{1\} * \\ & \text{PUAPR}\{1\} * \text{PUBSE}\{0\} \rightarrow \text{bad local government reform.} \end{aligned}$$

The formula is quite complex, so only small measure of parsimony has been achieved. However, we can observe that the 1st term of configuration conditions $\text{PARLL}\{0\} * \text{VERAC}\{0\} * \text{CONCO}\{0\} * \text{PUAPR}\{0\} * \text{PUBSE}\{0\}$ of cases (Cao Bang+QuangNinh) and 2nd term of configuration conditions $\text{PARLL}\{0\} * \text{TRANS}\{0\} * \text{VERAC}\{0\} * \text{CONCO}\{0\} * \text{PUBSE}\{0\}$ of cases (Lai Chau+QuangNinh) presented in the formula 2. We can see that there is an exchange of $\text{PUAPR}\{0\}$ and $\text{TRANS}\{0\}$ in these two configurations which may associate to affect the negative outcome of local government reform. It means that transparency and public administrative procedures can exchange for generating the negative outcome of local government reform.

Minimizing value the [1] Configurations (With Logical Remainders)

In order to achieve more parsimony, it is necessary to run the TOSMANA to include non-observed cases, called “logical remainders”.¹ The logical remainders constitute a pool of potential cases that can be used by TOSMANA to produce a more parsimonious minimal formula. To include the non-observed cases is to express those 16 cases in a simpler way

¹ We should add that, for all the csQCA tests which include such “logical remainders”, we systematically checked for “contradictory simplifying assumptions” (CSAs). If such CSAs were to be observed, it would be a problem which would need to be solved by further tests (Rihoux&Ragin 2008, 2010, Hai Do 2008; Vanderborght& Yamasaki 2004). Gladly, none of our tests have produced such CSAs – so, we can consider our minimal formulas (for the “1” and “0” outcomes, respectively) as being logically valid, and as being a solid starting point for interpretation.

(Rihoux and De Meur, 2008, pp. 60-61). As a result of TOSMANA software, we obtained the formula 3 as follows:

PARLL{0}CONCO{1} +	VERAC{0}PUBSE{1} +	PUAPR{1}PUBSE{1}
(Dong Nai)	(Binh Duong)	(HaiPhong+DaNang,DongThap,CanTho)

In terms of theoretical knowledge, we can note that there is an important combination of two conditions such as PUAPR{1}PUBSE{1} (Formula 3) in cases of (HaiPhong+DaNang,DongThap,CanTho) to generate the positive outcome of local government reform.

We also look at two cases of two paths, the first case is Dong Nai province. The condition CONCO{1} (Dong Nai) plays the key role to generate the positive outcome of local government reform, even in weak condition of PARLL{0}. Backing to case Dong Nai province, we can see there is high level of control of corruption in public service delivery (1.84) and very willingness to fight corruption of authorities (1.75), especially there is very equity in employment (0.91). However, there is very low level of quality of elections. Thus, in the case, the participation is still rather good, just weak in quality of Elections.

The second path is Binh Duong province, the condition PUBSE{1} (Binh Duong) plays a key role to produce the positive outcome of local government reform. Looking back to the case, we can see the basic infrastructure development is a key to enhance the outcomes of local government reform. Besides one of the conditions measures the weak vertical accountability (VERAC{0}), even interactions with local authorities is still rather good, however the people's inspection boards is very weak to decide the weak vertical accountability.

From the case analysis, we chose the third term with formula 3 that PUAPR{1}PUBSE{1}, by words: The combination of two conditions of good public administrative procedures and good delivery of public services will bring the positive outcome of local government reform.

Minimizing value the [0] Configurations (With Logical Remainders)

We received the term from running the TOSMANA minimizing value the [0] configurations with logical remainders:

PARLL{1}PUBSE{0} +	VERAC{1}PUAPR{0} +	CONCO{0}PUBSE{0}
(Ha Giang+BacKan+DienBien+QuangNgai)	(Hung Yen+ThuaThien- Hue,Kon Tum)	(Cao Bang+LaiChau+QuangNinh)

In the provinces, existing of the combination of the following condition CONCO{0}PUBSE{0} (formula 4) → bad local government. The two conditions

PUBSE{0} and PUAPR{0} decided the '0' outcome value represented for negative local government outcome. Thus, as we do not expect to find "perfect causal symmetry" in social phenomena (Rihoux, de Meur 2008, 62-63). It means each one of which combines 02 conditions linked with the '0' outcome value, it is not correspondent to the conditions generating the positive outcome (see formula 3).

In the formula 5, PARLL{1}PUBSE{0} (Ha Giang+BacKan+DienBien+QuangNgai) can bring the negative outcomes of local government reform. It can be interpreted that even existing of PARLL{1}, the weak condition PUBSE{0} decides to produce the negative outcome of local government reform. From the experience of cases (Ha Giang+BacKan+DienBien+QuangNgai) reflected that quality of participation at local levels is not so high. For example, in Ha Giang case, we can see the civic knowledge (1.22) and quality of elections ((1.49) are low in PAPI. In BacKan province, the civic knowledge (1.12) and quality of elections ((1.58) are so low in PAPI. In Dien Bien province, the civic knowledge (1.2) is low in PAPI. In QuangNgai province, the civic knowledge (1.02) and quality of elections ((1.53) are very low in PAPI.

In formula 6, VERAC{1}PUAPR{0} (Hung Yen+ThuaThien-Hue,Kon Tum) can generate the negative outcome. It interprets that even existing of VERAC{1}, the weak condition PUAPR{0} still generate the negative outcomes of local government reform. Backing to experienced cases, we can see that in Hung Yen province, the responsive to citizen actions, people's inspection boards are all low in PAPI. In ThuaThien Hue and Kon Tum province, we can see that the people's inspection boards is so low in PAPI 1.09 and 1.17 respectively.

From the case analysis, finally in formula 4 [CONCO{0}PUBSE{0}], we accepted this combination condition, by word, we argued that the combination of weak conditions of control of corruption and public service delivery will generate bad outcome of local government reform.

4. Syntheses

Under study of management change with an analysis of political systems and contexts such as public sector could not be interpreted as some set of generic management, instead they require a broader shift in the pattern of political problems and responses, as such the public management is always a part of the broader agenda of public governance (see Pollite and Bouckaert 2003, 2004, 2011). In Vietnam's case, the outcomes of local governance are dependent on the variable conditions of the participation at local levels, transparency, vertical accountability, control of corruption in the public sector, public administrative procedures, public service delivery, the quality of elections and quality of people's inspection boards.

Backing to the research, transitional Vietnam is still considered a case of authoritarian system with very high efforts to run the public administration reform. From analysis, we see that if a combination of conditions PUAPR{1}PUBSE{1}, possibly it can generate the positive outcome. From case analysis (HaiPhong+DaNang,DongThap,CanTho), we substantially chose this configuration condition that interpreted by words, the combination of two conditions of good public administrative procedures and good delivery of public services will bring the positive outcome of local government reform.

Generally, we can see that in conditions of great efforts of public administration reform in authoritarian system, we can have the important combination of two variable conditions 'good public administrative procedures and good delivery of public services' that contributed to theory advancement.

Oppositely, generally if a combination of weak conditions of control of corruption and public service delivery [CONCO{0}PUBSE{0}], possibly it can generate negative outcome of local government reform.

5. Conclusions

Specifically, this paper reviews the Vietnamese government as a case study in transitional staging whose purpose is progress in human and socio-economic development. The local governance was analysed by the outcomes of local government reform which are combined of the variable conditions of the participation at local levels, transparency (information access), vertical accountability, control of corruption in the public sector, public administrative procedures, public service delivery. In particular case of Vietnam, the quality of elections and quality of people's inspection boards can also affect to the positive outcomes of local government reform. While the factors of civic knowledge and quality of elections can also decide the negative outcomes of local government reform.

Generally, from the systematic case study, the research contributed for theory advancement that in case of an authoritarian system in a transitional globalisation with great efforts of public administration reforms, if the combination of good public administrative procedures and good delivery of public services, it can bring the positive outcomes of local government reform. Oppositely, if the combination of weak conditions of control of corruption and public service delivery, it can generate negative outcomes of local government reform. Studying the outcomes of local government reform measured by PAR index under the combination of configuration conditions is the new approach that is opened to various studies of local government reform in the context of decentralisation, public administration reform in the world.

From conclusions, it is given the policy implications:

- *It should be able to promote participation at local level, especially the participation of people in policy implementation;*
- *It should be able to increase transparency with more information access of public service deliveries etc;*
- *It should be able to enhance vertical accountability, civil servants should be more accountable to the citizen;*
- *It must control the corruption in the public sector, especially for public service deliveries such as education, health care, clean water and sanitation ...etc;*
- *It should be able to cut down the public administrative procedures at public administration. It is special in Vietnam's case, so we will need to promote good public administrative procedures.*
- *It should be able to enhance the public service deliveries in localities. In Vietnam's context, it is better to promote the good delivery of public services.*

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