

Determinants of Microfinance Loan default: An empirical investigation in Sri Lanka

ABSTRACT

Microfinance aims to promote sustainable economic empowerment and capacity building to people in the developing countries. However, in recent times microfinance has captured the attention of a large audience as a system that is unmonitored, uncontrolled and irresponsible. Local and international literature continuously highlighted that microfinance loan default has implications not only at the micro economic level but also at the macroeconomic level. With this factor in mind this research aims to explore factors influencing microfinance loans in Sri Lanka. Both a deductive and a quantitative approach were employed in this research. A structured questionnaire was distributed among microfinance loan borrowers in the region of the Matugama Divisional Secretariat. The findings of this study confirmed that in microfinance institutes' strategies to control loan defaulting, the borrowers' family and group and macro-economic issues influenced loan defaulting of Sri Lankan microfinance customers. The findings of this study could be used by managers of MF institutes in issues such as managing risk and customer portfolio, access to CRIB, and requesting securities before granting a loan. Microfinance trainers could use these findings to design their training and consultation activities for loan borrowers. This knowledge would help borrowers to manage their loan risk while not facing the poverty trap.

Keywords: Microfinance, Loan default, Sri Lanka, Matugama Divisional Secretariat, Developing country

1. INTRODUCTION

The term "microfinance (MF)" refers to the provision of financial services to low income clients, including the self-employed [1]. Professor Mohammad Yunus started the concept of Grameen Bank with the aim of alleviating poverty through small loans for his country's rural poor [2]. In the last few decades, many developing countries have seen some transformation of their financial system experience with the advent of Microfinance Institutions (MFI). Mungure [3] observed that MFIs were established for the purpose of providing micro loans, savings, business advice and training to Micro and Small Enterprises (MSEs). Particularly MFIs were marked by poverty-related missions to help the poor access loans from financing MSEs [4].

There were 123 million MFI customers worldwide by 2016 with India as the leader in terms of MF in 2016 [5]. The ranking shows a strong impetus in South Asia while Latin America and the Caribbean are also highly active in the field of microfinance. According to Daily fit-[6], there is a credit gap of \$2.5 to \$3.58 billion between licensed financial institutions and

32 potential customer needs in Sri Lanka. Hence, microfinance institutions must contribute to
33 bridge this gap.

34 The sustainability of MFIs heavily depends on the ability to collect their loans efficiently and
35 effectively. The repercussions of loan defaults on MFIs include inability to disburse more
36 loans in future, reducing operating profits and undermining liquidity. Despite the growth of
37 microfinance in Sri Lanka, MFIs face default problems which are a serious challenge to
38 sustainability of MFIs. If loan arrears persist, poverty-related problems can increase rather
39 than decrease. Recently, many experiences faced in Sri Lanka confirm and demonstrate the
40 seriousness of this problem in the MF sector. MF has already been banned in the Northern
41 Province by the government due to the ongoing conflicts in poverty reduction. Hence, there
42 is an urgent need to investigate the factors affecting microfinance loan defaults in Sri
43 Lanka. This study aims to identify and analyze the factors influencing MF loan default in Sri
44 Lanka.

45 As a developing country, Sri Lanka has to face many economic and social problems. MF
46 plays a significant role in poverty alleviation, rural development, gender equality (through
47 women empowerment) and quality education which are considered key goals of sustainable
48 development. Therefore, a study of the microfinance sector and loan default is critical for
49 development as a whole. The current study will serve as a useful reference document for
50 loan policy developers, potential investors, government authorities and other stakeholders in
51 identifying and solving this issue.

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54 **2. LITERATURE REVIEW**

55

56 **2.1 Microfinance**

57 Microfinance is a financial transactions service that offers financial assistance to
58 unemployed or low-income individuals or groups deprived of access to financial services.
59 According to Kaoma [7], the main aim of microfinance is to eradicate poverty and empower
60 the women. These two aspects are also recognized as two of the major millennium
61 development goals.

62 Professor Yunus started his Grameen Banks with the intention of alleviating poverty by
63 providing small loans to his country's rural destitute [2]. This initial process was begun as
64 an experiment in the outskirts of Chittagong University in the village of Jobra, Bangladesh.
65 Its objective was to grant loans to the rural poor without collateral at full-cost interest
66 repayable in regular installments [8].

67 Later, the Grameen Banks confirmed that its customers subscribe to a basic list of ways that
68 the poor can improve their living status. In appreciation of this great work, in 2006 the Nobel
69 Peace Prize was awarded to both Professor Yunus and the Grameen Bank for their
70 contribution to developing the concept of microfinance.

71 Microfinance originated as a self-financing model to provide social benefits to the rural poor.
72 However now it has changed into business models which enable the poor to earn an income
73 while enjoying social benefits.

74

75 **2.2 Sri Lankan MF Context**

76 As a developing country, Sri Lanka has a long history of a fundamental system of
77 microfinance. "Cheetu" in Sri Lanka has been operating at least from the beginning of early
78 20th century. MF is still considered as an informal but effective way of capital accumulation
79 and saving. However, it functioned as a basic method of MF for the poor. The microfinance
80 sector in Sri Lanka now covers a wide range of institutions and products and provides a
81 significant mode of financial inclusion and empowerment for the low income and poor
82 sections of society.

83 In Sri Lanka, MF has a long history and today a large number of institutions provide
84 microfinance services, particularly to the poorest households [9]. These institutions include

85 licensed commercial banks, licensed finance companies, co-operative rural banks, thrift and
86 credit co-operatives societies, Divinaguma banks, other community-based organizations,
87 microfinance companies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Some of these
88 intuitions are regulated by different authorities such as the Central Bank of Sri Lanka,
89 Department of Cooperative Development and the Department of Divinaguma Development.
90 There are almost 200 MF organizations operating in the country, out of which only 100 MF
91 organizations are identified as having an established country-wide network.
92 There are some impostors pretending to be microfinance companies in Sri Lanka engaged in
93 business activities that seem to be MF and charge high interest rates from its customers that
94 would lead poor people to further distress. Most of the time customers blame and complain
95 against these types of illegal microfinance companies adversely affecting their goodwill.

96 It is argued in the literature that the greater the concern for microfinance institutions (MFIs)
97 aiming for financial sustainability, the lesser the impact on poverty reduction, and hence
98 there is a tradeoff between outreach to the poor and financial sustainability [10]. It has also
99 been argued that the microfinance institutions (MFIs) are more concerned about their
100 financial sustainability rather than reducing poverty. Hence, there is a tradeoff between
101 outreach (ability of MF institutes to reach poor remote people) and its sustainability (ability to
102 cover its operating costs). Therefore, there is a need to regulate and supervise the
103 microfinance institutions in Sri Lanka. Parliament enacted the Microfinance Act No. 6 of 2016
104 which came into effect on 15th July, 2016. It provides for licensing, supervising and
105 regulating microfinance business known as licensed microfinance companies (LMFCs). Non-
106 governmental microfinance organizations are registered under Act No. 31 of 1980 (VSSO
107 Act) by the Registrar of Voluntary Social Service Organizations (CBSL).

108 **2.3 Loan Defaults**

109 Default refers to a situation where a borrower fails to repay a loan. According to Mensah [11]
110 and Gatimu [12] arrears refer to a late payment, partial payment or a skipped payment.
111 When repayment is delayed, a loan is considered as a delinquent loan which loan turns into
112 default where the chance of recovering the loan becomes minimal. Delinquency shows
113 increased risk of loss and a warning against operational problems so that measuring
114 delinquency becomes very important.

115 The reasons for MF loan default could differ with borrowers assigning one set of factors and
116 loan officers in the field assigning another set. A study conducted by Addae-Korankye [13]
117 found that factors assigned by borrowers are not the main reasons for loan default.
118 Therefore, loan officers need to be vigilant in order to minimize the risk of loan default.
119 Further, Mungure [3] emphasized that most loan defaults are not only by bad borrowers;
120 MFIs are also known to have contributed to loan default.

121 High interest rates and delays in loan delivery could significantly increase transaction costs
122 and also adversely affect e repayment performance [14]. Loan shortages, disbursement lag,
123 small farm size, high interest rate, age of farmers and poor supervision have been identified
124 as the major reasons for loan default [15]. According to the study conducted by Sheila [16],
125 inadequate financial analysis is another cause of microfinance loan default.

126 Kohansal [17] showed that the income of farmers in the Kohansan-Razavi province of Iran
127 has a positive effect on loan repayment while loan interest and the number of installments
128 have a negative effect on loan repayment performance. According to a study conducted by
129 Waweru [18] in Kenya, most of the causes of loan default rests with MFIs and failure to
130 manage self-help groups (SHGs). Management of a business is a vital while poor business
131 practice is another reason for loan default. According to Besley, a positive consequence is
132 that successful group members may have a motivation to repay the loans of group members
133 whose projects have yielded insufficient returns to make repayment worthwhile. The
134 negative effect rises when the entire group defaults, even when some members would have
135 repaid individual loans.

136 In addition, macro-economic factors also need to be considered. A study done by Waweru
137 [18] illustrates that some of the reasons behind loan default in Kenyan banks were national
138 economic downturn and reduced consumer purchasing power. Thus, price levels and
139 economic growth are very important in assessing the loan repayment ability of recipients.
140 According to Kwakwa [20] real Gross Domestic Product decline and depreciation of foreign
141 exchange rate directly affect the repayment ability of borrowers. Furthermore, Fofack [21]
142 stated that macroeconomic stability and economic growth are associated with diminishing
143 loan default. Accordingly, the goal of achieving minimum loan default to ensure a healthy
144 loan portfolio will ultimately lead to the sustainability of MFIs.
145 According to prior studies, MF institutional factors, factors of family and MF loan group and
146 macroeconomic factors have been identified as the major causes of loan default in this
147 study.

148 149 **3. STUDY DESIGN**

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151 Most international as well as national studies have referred to qualitative approaches to
152 exploring the factors influencing microfinance loan default. However, this study used the
153 quantitative approach that expects to identify the factors affecting microfinance loan default
154 in Sri Lanka with specific reference to the Matugama Divisional Secretariat, which was
155 selected because it is one of the districts that obtained the highest number of MF loans in Sri
156 Lanka.

157 Since the population of this study comprised MF loan borrowers in the geographical region
158 of Matugama a convenience sampling method was used. Convenience sampling is the one
159 of the main types of non-probability sampling methods and refers to the collection of
160 information from members of the population who are conveniently available to the
161 researcher for the data that the researcher is seeking.

162 Even though data collection started with convenience sampling, after interviewing the
163 respondents, their references were used to identify other respondents. Therefore, at the
164 latter stage of the study the snowball sampling method was used. A total of 133 respondents
165 were selected among 7 GNDs under the Divisional Secretariat of Matugama in order to
166 collect the data required for study.

167 168 **3.1 Data Collection**

169 Structured questionnaires consisting of close-ended questions were developed in line with
170 the objectives of the study. They included income of the family, size of the family, and
171 educational qualifications and demographic factors according to previous studies and
172 literature [22; 13; 23]. A five-point Likert scale was used to identify microfinance institutional
173 factors, macro-economic factors and factors of MF group and family that could impact on
174 microfinance loan default. The language and wording of the questionnaire were aimed to
175 elicit the responses of as MF loan borrowers. Generally, they have a low education level,
176 poor English and use of idiom. Thus the questionnaire was designed in Sinhala and for
177 analysis, all data and information were translated into English.

178 179 **3.2 Data Analysis**

180 The data analysis was conducted using SPSS version 22. In order to analyze and present
181 the data, a descriptive analysis was done. The internal consistency of the study instruments
182 and instrument subscales was measured using Cronbach's alpha. The factor analysis was
183 done using the principle axis factoring method to ensure construct validity.

184 185 **4. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS**

186 187 **4.1 Demographic Profile of the Sample**

188 The data was collected from 133 microfinance loan borrowers. The 133 questionnaires did
 189 not have any missing value or invalid response. As for age, 38.3% of the respondents
 190 belong to the age category of more than 45 years and considered mature. The next highest
 191 age category of 31-40 years formed 24.8% of the total respondents while 18-30 years and
 192 31-40 years categories were 19.5% and 17.3% respectively. The majority of microfinance
 193 borrowers who participated in the study had five family members including the respondent
 194 (30.1%) while the next number of members was 4 and 6 representing 22.6% and 21.8%
 195 respectively. Those with 2 family members represented 7.5% while those with 8 family
 196 members represented 0.8% including the respondent. The educational profile of the
 197 respondents indicated that the majority of respondents had completed Grade 9 and formed
 198 51.9% of the total while 40.6% of respondents had qualifications up to GCE (O/L). Only one
 199 graduate respondent (08. %) had obtained MF loans while 6.8% respondents had completed
 200 GCE (A/L). In respect of average monthly income as many as 51.5% of respondents were
 201 in the income range of Rs.10, 000 – 30,000. The next highest income range was Rs.30,
 202 000 - Rs 50,000 earned by a percentage of 32.3%. Those in the income range of less than
 203 Rs. 10, 000 and more than Rs 50, 000 were less than those in other income ranges -4.5%
 204 and 12.0% respectively. The study further focused on borrowers who are members of the
 205 microfinance loan group. Most of the microfinance loan groups consisted of five members,
 206 that is, 54.5% of the total. Here we identified another two groups of 3 and 4 members
 207 respectively who represented 28.6% and 16.5% respectively of the total sample.

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4.2 MF Loans

210 The main focus was on identifying the actual purpose of borrowing rather than the purpose
 211 stated in the loan application. To repair/build a house accounted for a high percentage, that
 212 is, 36.8% while 11.3% of respondents had obtained loans to start a new business and 21.8%
 213 to expand their existing business. However, the second highest percentage 30.1% of
 214 borrowers obtained loans to settle existing loans.

215

216 Next, the study focused on current status of MF group loans in order to identify trend of loan
 217 defaults. The majority of respondents (87.2%) had repaid their loans themselves and 3%
 218 had repaid their loans through group members rather than by the borrowers themselves.
 219 There were some cases (9.8%) where both borrowers and group members repaid the MF
 220 loans.

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4.3 MF institutional factors (MFI)

222 Seven statements in the survey instrument were intended to measure MFI. The KMO value
 223 was 0.709 and p-value of the Bartlett's test of Sphericity (Chi-square=221.155, df= 21) was
 224 significant (P< 0.05). The analysis confirmed that the two-factor solution with a Cronbach's
 225 alpha of 0.741 confirmed that these statements were a reliable measure of the MFI
 226 construct. However, it was identified that the first of the two factors led to MFI consisted of
 227 the statements in the questionnaire MF12, MF14, MF13, and MF15 while MF12 led the group
 228 with its highest contribution. The second factor of the MF factor consisted of MF16, MF17 and
 229 MF11 while MF16 led with the highest contribution. In summary, 56.82% of the variance of the
 230 MFI construct was explained through the seven statements which were divided into two
 231 factors (Table 1).

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Table 1: Explanatory factor analysis for MFI

Item label	Statement	Factor loading		Cronbach's alpha	% variance
		Component			
		1	2		

MFI2	MF Institute has approved adequate advances/loans	0.851		0.741 Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4	56.82
MFI4	I am satisfied with the procedures that MF institute followed to approve the loan	0.767			
MFI3	The loan was granted at the right time I expected	0.761			
MFI5	When I applied for the loan, MF institute estimated my total debt	0.436			
MFI6	MF institute suggested to me a simple and easy instalment payment method		0.820		
MFI7	MF institute arranged workshops, technical instructions and financial knowledge, after they granted me a loan		0.697		
MFI1	The Interest rate of the MF Institute of my choice is more attractive than of the other institute		0.648		

235 Overall (Annexure 1), majority of respondents disagreed with statement that *the interest rate*
236 *of the MF institute of their choice is more attractive than of another institute*. However, most
237 of the respondents who had defaulted group loans disagreed with the statement and also
238 majority of those who hadn't defaulted the MF group loans also disagreed with the
239 statement. Most of the respondents agreed that the *MF institute had approved adequate*
240 *loans*, according to the overall result. But most of respondents who had defaulted MF group
241 loans were neutral and disagreed with this statement. The overall result was mostly
242 dependent in the responses of those ones who hadn't defaulted since most of them had
243 agreed or strongly agreed with the statement. From the overall responses most of
244 participants agreed that the *loan was granted at the right time they expected*. However, that
245 was mostly affected by the responses of those who hadn't defaulted. The majority of
246 respondents who had defaulted disagreed with the statement that the loan was not granted
247 at the right time they expected. Overall, the respondents were satisfied with the *procedure*
248 *that MFI followed to approve loans*. However, the majority of respondents who had defaulted
249 were not satisfied with the procedures followed. The overall result differs because most of
250 the borrowers who hadn't defaulted agreed with the statement. Overall, the majority of them
251 agreed that the *MF institute had estimated their total debt before approving the loan*. Even
252 though those who had defaulted are neutral on this statement, the overall result is influenced
253 by the responses of those who hadn't defaulted; the majority of them agreed with the
254 statement. According to overall result the majority disagreed with the statement that the *MF*
255 *institute suggested a simple and easy installment method*. Considering the respondents who
256 had defaulted on MF group loans, most of them disagreed with this statement while most of
257 them who hadn't defaulted agreed with the same statement. Most of the respondents
258 strongly disagreed and disagreed with the statement that *MFI had not arranged workshops*
259 *and training programme after they had granted them a loan*. Considering results separately,
260 the majority of those who had defaulted and those who hadn't defaulted disagreed with the
261 statement.

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4.4 Influence of Family (F)

264 Table 2 gives the result of the factor analysis of the four items identified as measuring the
265 factors of family and the MF loan group. The KMO value was 0.681 and p-value of Bartlett's
266 test of Sphericity (Chi-square=79.987, df= 6) was significant (P< 0.05). Cronbach's alpha of
267 0.665 also confirmed that they were reliable measures of family influence. Also, F2 was the
268 most significant item leading to the family influence constructs. In summary, these four
269 statements explained 50.31% of the variance of family influence.

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Table 2: Explanatory factor analysis for influence of family

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Item label	Statement	Factor loading	Cronbach's alpha	% variance
F2	My family members help me to settle the loans.	0.808	0.665	50.31
F1	I think, my total family income is sufficient to settle future total debt.	0.751		
F4	My group members encourage me to pay the loan instalments on the due date.	0.668		
F3	Members of the loan group support me to manage the credit.	0.590		

273 According to the overall result (Annexure 1) most of the respondents thought *their total*
 274 *family income was sufficient to settle their remaining total debt*; they agreed with the
 275 statement. However, the majority of respondents who had defaulted MF group loans
 276 disagreed with the above statement while the majority of respondents who hadn't defaulted
 277 MF group loans agreed with the said statement. Most of the respondents agreed and
 278 strongly agreed with the statement that *their family members help to settle their loans*.
 279 According to those who had defaulted MF group loans, the majority agreed with the
 280 statement and also there was not much difference from the responses of people who hadn't
 281 defaulted MF group loans. Most of them also agreed and strongly agreed with the statement.
 282 The majority of all respondents were neutral about the *support of members of the loan group*
 283 *for them to manage credit*. However, the majority of the respondents who had defaulted
 284 disagreed with the statement that the loan group supported them to manage credit. Most of
 285 those who hadn't defaulted MF group loans were neutral on the above statement, which
 286 affects the overall result. Overall, the result depicted that the majority of respondents
 287 strongly agreed which indicates *group members encouraged them to pay their installments*
 288 *on the due date*. However, most of the respondents who had defaulted MF group loans were
 289 neutral about this statement while the respondents who hadn't defaulted MF group loans
 290 strongly agreed with this statement.

291

292 **4.5 Macroeconomic factors (ECO)**

293 A total of four statements was assumed to measure the macroeconomic impact construct in
 294 this study. Factor analysis revealed a one-factor solution, with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.580,
 295 which is approximately 0.6 (acceptable) and confirming that these statements were reliable
 296 measures of ECO. The KMO value was 0.557 and p-value of Bartlett's test of Sphericity
 297 (Chi-square=74.3995, df= 6) was significant (P< 0.05). In summary, these four statements
 298 explained 45.95% of the variance of ECO (Table 3).

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Table 3: Explanatory factor analysis for ECO

Item label	Statement	Factor loading	Cronbach's alpha	% variance
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ECO2	Depreciation of the rupee against the USD, have adversely affected to the ability of my loan repayment	0.871	0.580	45.95
ECO1	Inflation is adversely affecting the ability to repay my loan.	0.753		
ECO4	Political instability of the country and village level, adversely affecting to the ability of my loan repayment	0.668		
ECO3	Frequent weather changes and natural disasters adversely affect my ability to repay my loan.	0.419		

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Annexure 1 shows that most of the respondents thought *the inflation effect on our economy adversely affect ability to repay their loan*. The majority of e respondents who had defaulted MF group loans strongly agreed with the above statement. Most of the respondents who hadn't defaulted MF group loans also agreed and strongly agreed with the above. Most of the respondents were neutral about the *effect of depreciation of foreign exchange rate on their ability to repay loans*. Most of the respondents who had defaulted MF group loans agreed that depreciation of the foreign exchange rate adversely affected their ability to repay their loans. However, according to the responses of the majority of those who hadn't defaulted MF group loans were neutral about the statement. Overall, the majority of respondents strongly agreed that frequent *weather changes and natural disasters adversely affecting their ability to repay*. Most of those who had defaulted strongly agreed with the statement. The majority of those who hadn't defaulted also agreed with the above statement. According to the overall result, most of them were neutral or agreed about the *political instability at the country and village level adversely affecting their ability to repay*. The majority of respondents who had defaulted MF group loans agreed with the statement while the majority of respondents who hadn't defaulted MF group loans were neutral.

5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The main objective of this study was to identify and analyze the factors influencing MF loan default in Sri Lanka. After analyzing the collected data, the conceptual framework was changed after the factor analysis. MF institutes and their strategies were loaded into two factors: "Loan granting procedure" and "Customer services". Family influence was loaded into a single factor as expected earlier whereas statements included in the macro economy were loaded into a single factor. Furthermore, none of the statements was removed from the whole data set as each statement in the three constructs was supported by each construct.

MF institutional factors (MFI)

In the factor loading results sheet, the MFI2 statement makes the highest contribution. This statement looks at the on-loan size approved by the MF institute according to the borrower's perspective. Balogun [15] stated that loan shortfall or inadequate loan size highly affects loan default. The results of this study confirmed that most of the respondents had defaulted due to inadequate loan size. However, respondents who had not defaulted accepted the loan size offered by MFIs. These results indicate that defaulted loan holders try to obtain loans irrespective of the amount of the loan as a matter of habit. This also again adversely affects the repayment performance.

Most of the respondents who have defaulted were not satisfied with MFI's procedures followed by the MF institutes for loan approval. A proper approval process would help the MF institution to mitigate the risk of default. But other respondents were satisfied with the approval process because it is favorable to both borrowers and institutes to manage their loan portfolios and the repayment base.

344 Results of the study showed that MF loans were granted at the right time they expected.
345 Olomola [14] emphasized that delays in loan delivery significantly impacts on loan
346 repayment ability. However, borrowers in default did not agree with the statement. It seems
347 they were applying for a loan for urgent and not for the well-planned projects or income
348 generation. Without taking reasonable time to grant a loan causes a negative impact on the
349 profitability of MFIs. But too much delay to deliver may cause borrowers to default.
350 Sheila [16] stated that inadequate financial analysis is another cause of microfinance loan
351 default. Our study showed that both defaulting and non-defaulting borrowers agree on the
352 estimation of the total debt of borrowers. It is vital to identify the ability to repay and avoid the
353 risk of loan default.
354 In factor loading this statement leads to the construct making the highest contribution. The
355 statement aims to look at how borrowers perceive installment methods suggested by the M
356 F institute. According to the study, the majority of respondents mentioned that the
357 installment method was not an easy and simple method. This fact was confirmed by
358 Kohansal [17] who also indicated that the number of installments had a negative effect on
359 repayment. However, microfinance officers personally visit and collect weekly and bi-weekly
360 installments in order to mitigate default risk. But it does seem to be an easy task for
361 borrowers to repay their loans.

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363 The literature highlights poor loan supervision as the major cause of loan default [15]. This
364 was also confirmed by the results of this study. Without a training and knowledge of loan
365 management, the MF institute cannot expect their borrowers to repay their loans on time.
366 Therefore, to minimize the loan default risk MFIs need to do proper supervision.

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368 A loan installment consists of both principal and interest. The problem here is that the
369 borrowers are not going to find out how much of interest is charged by the institute
370 compared to other MF institutes. However, results of the study showed that the interest rate
371 of the MF institute of the customer's choice is not attractive. Hence, this means MFIs charge
372 high interest on their MF loans. Okpugie [24] and Vandel [25] also emphasized that high
373 interest rate charged by most MFIs was the reason behind loan default. Borrowers have to
374 pay more than what they have to usually pay. Ultimately, this adversely affects the loan
375 repayment performance of the borrowers as well as the healthy loan portfolio of the MFIs.

376 377 **5.1 Family Influence**

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379 Factor loading of F2 leads the construct to make the highest contribution. The statement was
380 developed to identify the support of family members to repay loans. Without the support and
381 help of family members, borrowers cannot repay their loans on time. MFIs can avoid this
382 problem of loan delinquency by taking action to enhance the borrower's family
383 cohesiveness; the results confirmed that this aspect directly affects the borrowers'
384 repayment ability.

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386 Family income (F1) also has a considerable impact on loan repayment performance.
387 Kohansal [17] highlighted that the income of farmers has positive effect on loan repayment.
388 This study also confirmed that the family income of borrowers is sufficient to settle remaining
389 loans and debt without obtaining new loans. MFIs especially need to disburse credit to
390 borrowers engaged in income generation activities in order to mitigate risk of default.

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392 Today, almost MF loans disbursed among borrowers are based on the group loaning
393 mechanism as collateral. This statement was constructed to know how group members
394 contribute to the payment on installments on the due date. This result indicated that
395 members of the group encouraged borrowers to repay their loans without delay. It seems
396 that they try to mitigate default themselves, as stated by Besley [19].

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398 Most of the time group members interact with each other until they obtain loans. Afterwards,
399 they do not discuss how to manage their loans. Thus, this statement looks at the support
400 from group members to manage their credit. The study revealed that borrowers in previous
401 default do not have the support of members to manage credit. It may have a significant
402 impact on the repayment performances. Therefore, interaction among group members is
403 vital to minimize the risk of default.

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405 **5.2 Macroeconomic factors**

406 In factor loading ECO2 leads the construct by making the highest contribution. According to
407 Kwakwa [20], depreciation of the foreign exchange rate directly affected the loan repayment
408 ability of the borrowers. The statement looks at how exchange rate depreciation impacts on
409 loan repayment. The study showed that most borrowers were not aware of the foreign
410 exchange rate and therefore their responses were neutral. However, defaulting borrowers
411 mentioned that the foreign exchange rate depreciation only negatively impacted on their
412 repayment performance.

413 Price levels in the country increase day by day threatening the living status of the people,
414 especially low and middle level income families. If they have to pay more for goods and
415 services, purchasing power declines. Also, repayment ability diminishes. Thus, the
416 statement was meant to understand the impact of inflation on repayment performance of
417 loan holders. As illustrated by Waweru [18], inflation reduces purchasing power and result of
418 the study also showed a negative impact on loan repayment performance.

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420 According to Fofack [21], macro-economic stability diminishes the level of loan default. The
421 statement was designed to look at how political instability in the country affects repayment
422 performance. The study revealed that political instability in the country and at village level
423 has not much of an impact on loan default. It seems that repayment performance of
424 borrowers does not depend on political parties or their actions.

425

426 Sri Lanka as well as the Matugama region has to face frequent weather changes and natural
427 disasters. Consequently, the study specially focused on weather and natural disasters. The
428 majority of respondents who either defaulted or did not default on loans agreed with the
429 statement which referred to frequent weather changes and natural disasters adversely
430 affected the ability to repay loans. It appears that people are highly involved in activities
431 affected by weather changes and natural disasters.

432

433 This study contributes to the knowledge of microfinance even though the subject has been
434 well explored qualitatively by ample research. MF is a mature field now and loan default has
435 become an emerging issue. The quantitative model developed by the researcher can in
436 future be expanded with a much larger sample. In this study the researcher developed some
437 variables and factors that influence loan defaults in a developing country in the South Asian
438 region. Therefore, emerging economies and future researchers can use this as a base.

439 Managers of MFIs can identify the most important factors affecting loan default with
440 reference to the perspectives of the borrowers. According to the findings and results of the
441 study, there are many borrowers who have already defaulted on loan repayments but obtain
442 new loans from different institutes. Before granting a loan, a proper appraisal process should
443 be conducted by the MFI's loan officers. MFIs should follow clear and effective credit or
444 lending policies and procedures and must be regularly reviewed. The results of this study
445 suggest that managers explore new customer bases rather than searching for and offering
446 loans to existing customers in the interests of risk management, which means mature
447 borrowers, are not guilty of serious default issues because they know that group members
448 may repay on their behalf if they are in arrears. The formation of strong solidarity groups is a
449 possible remedy for high default and MFIs must supervise and review each and every loan

450 borrower while providing training and workshops for better performance. Otherwise, they
451 obtain loans for different purposes and cause trouble with repayment. Loans should be
452 granted to people involved in income generation activities. The results of this study confirm
453 that most of MF loans are for the purpose of settling other loans, which means their
454 repayment ability is very low.

455 Governing bodies and policy makers can take action to minimize the risk of loan default of
456 the MF sector. The government should endeavor to ensure their success and wealth by
457 formulating policies that create a favorable environment for businesses and financial
458 institutions to operate. Regulatory authorities should take action to control MFIs in order to
459 create a favourable business environment, especially a favourable interest rate mechanism
460 and workshops for credit management. Also, policy makers and regulatory officials should
461 prepare standards and minimum requirements for granting MF loans a second time. The
462 intention of borrowers who have already defaulted on loan repayments is to obtain loans at
463 any time at any cost from anywhere. Furthermore, the study reveals that loan holders who
464 are already in default have obtained loans again. This is a serious issue of default in the Sri
465 Lankan context. Therefore, this study suggests that policy holders and regulatory bodies like
466 the Central Bank to grant access to the CRIB report for formal MFIs to avoid loan
467 delinquency.

468 Despite the contributions of this study, as listed above, there are certain limitations that need
469 to be noted. A paper-based questionnaire fails to gather qualitative information such as inner
470 feelings and perceptions of respondents about the hidden reasons behind loan default with
471 MF institutions in Sri Lanka. Therefore, future researchers could use longitudinal research to
472 understand the changes in borrowers' perceptions and behaviours as well as MFIs'
473 perceptions over time. Data was collected from only from loan borrowers. Other
474 stakeholders such as MFI managers, executives, family members of loan borrowers and
475 group members can help to understand the true picture about loan defaults. Hence, future
476 researchers could consider data collection from a diverse pool of respondents in order to
477 receive better results and to develop a model that explains factors influencing loan default in
478 Sri Lanka.

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481 **COMPETING INTERESTS**

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483 Authors have declared that no competing interests exist

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Table I: Summary of Mean and SD for each of the statement in the questionnaire

Item label	Micro finance institutional factors	Mean	Std. Deviation
MF11	The Interest rate of the MF institute of my choice is attractive than the other institute	2.92	1.271
MF12	MF Institute has approved adequate advance/ loan	3.51	1.132
MF13	The loan was granted at the right time I was expecting	3.55	1.055
MF14	I am satisfied with the procedures that MF institute followed to approve the loan	3.23	1.193
MF15	When I was applying the loan, MF institute estimated my total debt	3.57	.932
MF16	MF institute suggested to me a simple and easy installment payment method	3.19	1.194
MF17	MF institute arranged workshops, technical instructions and financial knowledge, after they granted me a loan	1.89	.987
	Average	3.12	1.109
F1	I think, my total family income is sufficient to settle future total debt.	3.55	1.177
F2	My family members help me to settle the loans.	3.70	1.161
F3	Members of the loan group support me to manage the credit.	2.92	1.122
F4	My group members encourage me to pay the loan installments on the due date.	4.05	.960
	Average	3.56	1.105
ECO1	Inflation is adversely affecting the ability to repay my loan.	3.96	1.157
ECO2	Depreciation of the rupee against the USD, have adversely affected to the ability of my loan repayment	3.11	.994
ECO3	Frequent weather changes and natural disasters adversely affect my ability to repay my loan.	4.02	.961
ECO4	Political instability of the country and village level, adversely affecting to the ability of my loan repayment	2.88	1.181
	Average	3.49	1.073