

# Original Research Article

## The validity of Wagner's law in India: A post-liberalisation analysis

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### Abstract

**Aims:** The present study attempts to analyze the behavior of government expenditure in relation to economic growth using most appropriate advanced econometric techniques to test the Wagner's law of increasing State's activity in Indian scenario during the post-liberalization period of 1988 to 2017.

**Data:** The study uses the IMF database entitled "International Financial Statistics (IFS)" and World Bank database entitled "World Development Indicators (WDI)" for testing Wagner's law for the Indian economy.

**Results:** The results of Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) reveal that both the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the urban population have a positive and statistically significant effect on government expenditure in the long-run. Ceteris paribus, every 1.0 percent increase in GDP leads 0.36 percent increase in government expenditure. On the other hand, 1.0 percent increase in urban population leads to a 3.75 percent increase in government expenditure. The Granger causality results divulge that there is unidirectional causality running from urban population to government expenditure, whereas neither unidirectional nor bidirectional causality was found between GDP and public expenditure. In short-run, neither GDP nor urban population influences public expenditure.

Comment [u3]: Separate methodology from results. And create a conclusion section within the abstract

**JEL Classifications:** C32, E10, H50, O10

**Keywords:** Government expenditure, Wagner's law, gross domestic product, error correction model

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## 1. Introduction

40 The relation between government expenditure and national income<sup>1</sup> is very complex in  
41 nature and may vary depending upon the existing sphere of the State, that is between  
42 individualism and socialism. The most important question here before every scholar is to  
43 distinguish between the two statements that “Whether the States regulate their income by its  
44 expenditure” or “the expenditure or State’s activities are depending on its level of income?  
45 No matter the first statement is considered true in a contemporary world economy where  
46 *social welfare* and *development economics* has emerged as an important characteristic in  
47 political economy.

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48 But there is another point of view that firstly, when State decides to expand its activity  
49 to any new horizon it must consider the amount of burden on individual and nation because  
50 for increased government expenditure either the tax revenue or the internal and external debt  
51 need to be increased, which again depends on the ability to pay or the level of income of  
52 individuals in case of tax revenue and credit of the economy to raise internal or external debt.  
53 Secondly, in the modern era, most of the economies are now open and have trade and  
54 investment relationship with other nations. In such a case the State let the expenditure to run  
55 beyond the national income and borrow the difference.<sup>2</sup> These above mentioned two reasons  
56 serve as the two basic facts why the second statement that is “The State’s activities are  
57 depending on its level of income” rationally holds true. The present study will also examine  
58 the association between government expenditure and national income for India within this  
59 context.

60 It is very important here to mention the name of a distinguished German economist Adolf  
61 Wagner who first developed and analyzed the relationship between government expenditure  
62 (GE) and gross domestic product (GDP). According to him, the change in GE identified with  
63 the change in the economic organization and economic development e.g. change in  
64 population, technological improvement, increased benefits from economic activities, increase  
65 in productivity, increase in tax and non-tax revenue resources, etc. Before analyzing the  
66 existing literature on Wagner’s ‘*law of increasing State’s activities*’ and framing our  
67 hypotheses, it is very necessary to expose or uncover the ‘*Wagner’s law*’ based on original  
68 sources (Wagner, 1883, 1893, 1904, 1911). Peacock & Scott (2000) suggests to pay attention  
69 or to be cautious while applying intensive econometric testing on hypotheses because without  
70 properly defining the word ‘*State’s activity*’ we may lead to misspecification of modeling.

## 71 2. Wagner’s law: The conceptual framework

72 Wagner was the first scholar who identified a positive correlation between the level of  
73 economic development and the size of public sector in industrial economies. This was first  
74 observed for his own country and later he examined the same relationship for other  
75 economies too. In his seminal work (Wagner 1883 & 1893) he opined that in progressive  
76 societies, the activities of Central, State and Local governments increase regularly and there  
77 is a functional relationship exists between economic development and State’s activities.

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<sup>1</sup> Generally Gross Domestic Product (GDP) serves best to measure national income but for open economies (most of the nations are now have trade and investment partners) Gross National Income Per Capita (GNI PC) may also serves as a good indicator and that is why government expenditure may be affected by some exogenous factors e.g. Foreign Aid, Public Debt etc.

<sup>2</sup> Deficit financing is a phenomenon where funding is done through borrowing, a case when public expenditure is in excess of public revenue. It has been used by most of the developing nations to increase the demand of goods and services and fully utilise the underdeveloped resources.

78 No such concrete functional relationship was developed by Wagner (Dutt & Ghosh,  
79 1997) e.g. to measure increasing State's activity whether to take (i) Total government  
80 expenditure, (ii) proportion of total government expenditure to GDP or (iii) proportion of  
81 growth of public sector to total economy. In this regard, researchers have adopted different  
82 versions for empirical testing. Musgrave (1969) too claimed that the functional form is  
83 unclear but argued that Wagner was proposing (iii) proportion of growth of public sector to  
84 total economy and found it most appropriate from the readings of Wagner.

85 The expansion and intensification of State's activities are firstly because of the traditional  
86 sphere of functions which include defense, administrative activities and to maintain law &  
87 order. Secondly, public expenditure increases with increased industrialisation and  
88 urbanisation that lead to greater '*social complexities*' or '*frictions*' requiring increased  
89 '*sensitisation*' and '*social controls*.' It results in increased production of State-sponsored  
90 public or merit goods and services which generally include expenditure on health and  
91 education facilities, providing employment opportunities, increase social and economic  
92 welfare using development programmes. This type of expenditure is termed as 'Wagner's law  
93 version 1: Restructuring society' by Lybeck (1986).

94 Thirdly researchers have assessed that one important reason for increased State's activity  
95 is characterised by income elastic demand over the long run which depicts that when per  
96 capita income increases with economic growth, the demand for public or merit goods and  
97 services increases and people demand or prefer more of public goods and services. Lybeck  
98 (1986) termed this as 'Wagner's law version 2: Income elastic demand.' But if we closely  
99 look at Wagner's version, there is one more reason for increasing State's activities and that is  
100 to take over the management of natural monopolies<sup>3</sup> which is very important not only to  
101 enhance efficiency in production but also (to) maintain equity in distribution.

102 Many empirical and descriptive studies have been done to test the validity of Wagner's  
103 law of increasing State's activity. Most of them (Hook 1962; Mann 1980; Gould 1983; Neck  
104 & Schneider 1988; Paldan & Zeuthen 1988; Yousefi & Abizadeh 1992; Hackl *et al.* 1993)  
105 found support for Wagner's law using cross-section, time series, and panel data for different  
106 regions of the world. Particularly Paldan & Zeuthen (1988) used time-series data from 1948-  
107 85 for Denmark applying Ordinary Least Square (OLS) to total government consumption and  
108 transfers and found strong support for Wagner's law. If we enquire more about Denmark's  
109 public sector, we come to know that it grew more than any other Organisation for Economic  
110 Cooperation and Development (OECD) country in that phase which was an outcome of  
111 liberalisation and international integration policies adopted by the then government of  
112 Denmark in 1950s. Another study (Hackl *et al.* 1993) found same results for Australia using a  
113 larger time series from 1860-1986. This study used a series of significant independent  
114 variables like real GDP, current account deficit (CAD), federal deficit, population, etc.

115 Studies like Gupta (1967) and Bird (1971) also found strong support for Wagner's law  
116 and proved income elastic demand approach works when it comes to increased GE on public  
117 goods and services. Other than these Goffman & Mahar (1971), Henning & Tussing (1974),  
118 Ganti & Kolluri (1979), Beck (1985), Vatter & Walker (1986), Khan (1988), Ram (1987)  
119 also found strong support for income elastic demand run GE in long run. Henrekson (1993)  
120 suggested that to test the Wagner's law one should focus more on time series behaviour of  
121 public expenditure in a country for preferably a long period of time rather than on a cross-

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<sup>3</sup> Natural monopoly is a type of monopoly that exists due to high fixed costs of operations in a specific industry which creates high barriers to further entry and provide advantage to existing player.

122 section of economies because this phenomenon (increasing State's activity) relates to  
123 transition of a country alone.

124 On the other hand, some studies (Wagner & Weber 1977; Chrystal & Alt 1979; Pluta  
125 1981; Lybeck 1986; Ram 1986; Delortne *et al.* 1988; Saunders 1988; Gemmell 1993;  
126 Craigwell 1991; Hondroyiannis & Papapetrou 1995) found no or some support for Wagner's  
127 law. Among these Pluta (1981) measure the growth of public expenditure for 20 developing  
128 nations using a panel data from 1960 to mid-1970. The study found a very low share of GDP  
129 was actually spent by governments and if we compare this share of developing nations with  
130 OECD countries, it was more than double for the later (Lindauer, 1988). When we consider  
131 growth in GE the median elasticity for GE was slightly higher for developing nations than  
132 OECD countries. Similarly, Hondroyiannis & Papapetrou (1995) used maximum likelihood  
133 (ML) method for Greece and found no such support for Wagner's law. Blot & Debeauvais  
134 (1966) also tried to test the same for developing nations and found strong support for  
135 Wagner's law but the results are very limiting in sense because the study took government  
136 expenditure on education as dependent variable which is only a small part of total GE.

137 In past, a number of studies have examined the validity of Wagner's law but having  
138 conflicting results that differ country to country and not consistent either with cross-section,  
139 time series or panel data. In case of India too, we have literature that has conflicting findings  
140 among them Singh & Sahani (1984), Upendra & Ramakrishan (1994), Lalvani (1995), Singh  
141 (1997), Sahoo (2001) supported the Wagner's law but studies like Bhat et al. (1991) and  
142 Mohsin et al. (1995) refused the existence of any long-run relation between GE and GDP.  
143 Particularly, Verma & Arora (2010) used a bigger time series for India and confirms the  
144 validity of Wagner's law for long run only which was the result of liberalisation policies  
145 adopted in 1991 similar to Denmark.

### 146 3. Research Methodology


#### 147 3.1. Data

148 The study attempts to analyze the behavior of government expenditure in relation to  
149 economic growth using most appropriate advanced econometric techniques to test the  
150 Wagner's law of increasing State's activity in Indian scenario during the post-liberalization  
151 period of 1988 to 2017. The study uses the IMF database entitled "International Financial  
152 Statistics (IFS)" and World Bank database entitled "World Development Indicators (WDI)"  
153 for testing Wagner's law for the Indian economy. The appropriate price deflators have been  
154 used to avoid or neutralize the effect of any price change during the period.

**Comment [u9]:** choose better word to replace "used time series than spans xx to yy for india. Where xx and yy are the years covered by the study.

**Comment [u10]:** What are recent literature saying about this relationship? These are not the best of literature on the phenomena from the Indian Economy. Kindly provide the position of the most recent of literatures. The empirical support for your findings are too old.

**Comment [u11]:** Data should follow model specification.



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156 *Figures (1): Growth rates of GDP and GE, (2): Trend of GDP and GE (at level) & (3): Trend of GDP*  
157 *and GE (log-transformed).*

158 In case of India, both GDP and GE have increased rapidly in post-liberalization period  
 159 but the growth rate of GDP has always been ahead of GE for corresponding years. However,  
 160 the gaps in growth rates have decreased over the years (figure 1). We see a sharp increase in  
 161 GDP and GE after 2005 and both showed a similar trend over the study period (figure 2).  
 162 However, the rate of increase is much more for GE (figure 3).

### 163 3.2. Model Specification

164 In order to test the model, we have used the tri-variate model with government  
 165 expenditure as the dependent variable:

$$166 \ln(\text{GE}) = f(\ln(\text{GDP}), \ln(\text{UP})) \quad (1)$$

167 Where  $\ln(\text{GE})$ ,  $\ln(\text{GDP})$  and  $\ln(\text{UP})$  stand for the natural log of government expenditure,  
 168 gross domestic product, and urban population, respectively. Since both the dependent and  
 169 independent variables are converted into the logarithmic form, the coefficients can be  
 170 interpreted as the elasticity of the dependent variable with respect to the respective  
 171 independent variable. The expected signs of the independent variables are indeterminate, and  
 172 we test the hypothesis based on the signs and statistical significance of the coefficients. There  
 173 may be the following three possibilities:

- 174 1. If it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that the estimator of  $\beta_{it} = 0$ , we  
 175 conclude that the respective variables have neutral effect on government expenditure.
- 176 2. If the null hypothesis is rejected and  $\beta_{it} > 0$ , the respective variable has positive effect  
 177 on the government expenditure.
- 178 3. If the null hypothesis is rejected and  $\beta_{it} < 0$ , the respective variable is said to have a  
 179 negative effect on the government expenditure.

180 In the first stage of the testing procedure, we have used augmented Dickey-Fuller test and  
 181 Phillips-Perron test for testing the presence of unit roots in the variables of interest. If all the  
 182 variables are integrated of the same order, we proceed further to check for cointegration  
 183 among the variables. For this purpose, we have use Johansen cointegration. Johansen  
 184 cointegration test involves the construction of the VAR model at the levels of the variables.  
 185 The VAR model is specified as:

$$186 \mathbf{X}_t = \mu + \sum_{i=1}^p \beta_i \mathbf{X}_{t-i} + \varepsilon_t \quad (2)$$

187 Where  $\mathbf{X}_t$  is a vector of Variables ( $\ln(\text{GE})$ ,  $\ln(\text{GDP})$ ,  $\ln(\text{UP})$ ),  $\mu$  is a vector of constant  
 188 terms,  $\beta_i$  is a matrix of VAR parameters for lag  $i$ .  $\varepsilon$  is the vector of error terms. Two  
 189 likelihood tests viz. the Maximum Eigenvalue test and the Trace test are considered by  
 190 Johansen cointegration test to determine the number of cointegrating equations. Both the tests  
 191 test the null hypothesis of  $r$  cointegrating equations against the alternative hypothesis of  $n$   
 192 cointegrating equations, where  $n$  is the number of variables in the system.

193 Once the cointegration is confirmed, a vector error correction model (VECM)  
 194 estimated to estimate the long-run as well as short-run relationship among the variables of  
 195 interest. The regression equation form for VECM is as follows:

$$196 \Delta \mathbf{X}_t = \mu + \alpha \mathbf{X}_{t-1} + \Omega \sum_{i=1}^p \gamma_i \Delta \mathbf{X}_{t-j} + \varepsilon_t \quad (3)$$

197 Where  $\Delta$  represent the difference,  $\Omega$  is the error correction term,  $\mathbf{X}_t$  is the vector of variables,  
 198  $\alpha$  is a matrix of long-run coefficients,  $\gamma$  is a matrix of short-run coefficients and  $\varepsilon$  is the error  
 199 term.

200 **3.3. Granger Causality**

201 In the final step of the empirical analysis, we have used Granger causality test to  
 202 examine the causal relationship among the variables. Variable X is said to "Granger-cause"  
 203 variable Y if and only if the forecast of Y can be improved by using the past values of X  
 204 together with past values of Y, then by not doing so (Granger 1969). Granger causality is  
 205 either unidirectional or bidirectional (feedback). The traditional causality test proposed by  
 206 Granger (1969) suffers from the specification bias and the problem of spurious regression.  
 207 Firstly, for the specification bias, as pointed out by Gujarati (1995), this test is sensitive to  
 208 model specification and number of lags.

209 Toda & Yamamoto (1995) and Dolado & Lutkepohl (1996) have suggested an  
 210 alternative procedure based on augmented VAR, which gives the asymptotic distribution of  
 211 the Wald statistic (an asymptotic  $\chi^2$  -distribution), also known as modified Wald test statistic  
 212 (MWald). This test is deemed superior to the ordinary Granger-causality procedure because it  
 213 can be used irrespective of the order of integration of the variables.

214 The Toda & Yamamoto (1995) technique first take in the maximum order of  
 215 integration ( $d_{max}$ ) of the series that are to be included in the model. It is found by using any of  
 216 the unit roots tests. Secondly, an optimal lag length of  $k^{th}$  order for vector autoregressive  
 217 model needs to be specified. Thirdly, this procedure intentionally over-fits the underlying  
 218 model with additional  $d_{max}$  order of integration. The  $d_{max}$  is the maximal order of integration  
 219 of the series in the model. The VAR equation for testing Granger-causality in our model is  
 220 specified as below:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \begin{bmatrix} \ln(GE)_t \\ \ln(GDP)_t \\ \ln(UP)_t \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \alpha_1 \\ \alpha_2 \\ \alpha_3 \end{bmatrix} + \sum_{i=1}^k \begin{bmatrix} \beta_{11,i} & \beta_{12,i} & \beta_{13,i} \\ \beta_{21,i} & \beta_{22,i} & \beta_{23,i} \\ \beta_{31,i} & \beta_{32,i} & \beta_{33,i} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \ln(GE)_{t-i} \\ \ln(GDP)_{t-i} \\ \ln(UP)_{t-i} \end{bmatrix} + \\
 & \sum_{j=1}^{d_{max}} \begin{bmatrix} \beta_{11,k+j} & \beta_{12,k+j} & \beta_{13,k+j} \\ \beta_{21,k+j} & \beta_{22,k+j} & \beta_{23,k+j} \\ \beta_{31,k+j} & \beta_{32,k+j} & \beta_{33,k+j} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \ln(GE)_{t-k-j} \\ \ln(GDP)_{t-k-j} \\ \ln(UP)_{t-k-j} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} \epsilon_1 \\ \epsilon_2 \\ \epsilon_3 \end{bmatrix} \quad (4)
 \end{aligned}$$

223 Where all the variables are the same as previously stated, k is the number of lags for VAR,  $\alpha$   
 224 is the vector of constants,  $\beta_s$  are all parameter matrices;  $d_{max}$  is the highest order of integration  
 225 for the variables. We have used the VAR Granger/Block exogeneity Wald test to examine the  
 226 causal relationship among our variables of interest. We use the modified Wald test statistic  
 227 ( $\chi^2$ ) to test the null hypothesis of Granger non-causality.

228 **4. Empirical Analysis**  
 229 **4.1. Unit Root Tests**

**Table: 1**  
**Unit Root Tests**

**Comment [u12]:** All other tables should be presented in this manner.

Variables	Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test		Phillips-Perron Test		Outcome
	Levels	I-Difference	Levels	I-Difference	
ln (GE)	-2.01	-4.69***	-2.02	-4.67***	I (1)
ln (GDP)	2.08	-4.02***	2.21	-4.03***	I (1)
ln (UP)	1.47	-2.48**	-0.40	-2.48**	I (1)

232 Note: \*\* and \*\*\* denote 0.05 and 0.01 level of significance, respectively. ln(GE), ln(GDP) and  
 233 ln(UP) symbolise the natural log of final Government Expenditure, Gross Domestic Product (GDP)  
 234 and urban population, respectively.

235 Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, it is essential to conduct unit root tests on  
 236 all the variables. We have applied the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron  
 237 (PP) tests to detect the presence of unit roots in the variables. The results of the same has  
 238 been demonstrated in table 1.

239 The results reveal that log of government expenditure has a unit root at the levels as  
 240 the computed test statistic is greater than the tabular value at any conventional level of  
 241 significance. But the first difference of the variable is stationary as tabular value at any given  
 242 level of significance exceeds the computed value. The results are proved by the Phillips-  
 243 Perron test. Both the ADF and Phillips-Perron tests confirm that the log of the GDP is  
 244 nonstationary at the levels, but its first difference is stationary hereby implying that GDP is  
 245 integrated of order 1. Similar results are found for the log of urban population. Both the tests  
 246 prove that it has unit roots at the levels but the first difference of it is stationary implying that  
 247 it is also integrated of order one.

#### 248 4.2. Co-integration Test

249 Since all of the three variables are integrated of the same order, the next step is to test  
 250 for cointegration among the variables. We have used Johansen cointegration test here. The  
 251 results of the same have been depicted on table 2. The Johansen Cointegration test uses trace  
 252 and max-eigen value statistic to test the null hypothesis of no cointegration. Results in the  
 253 table 2 reveal that according to both the statistics null hypothesis of no cointegrating equation  
 254 is rejected in favour of at most one cointegrating equation by both the test statistics as the  
 255 tabular value (shown in parenthesis) are less than the computed ones. But none of the test  
 256 statistics could reject the null of at most one or two cointegrating equations. Therefore, it may  
 257 be concluded that all the variables in the system are cointegrated when we take log of  
 258 government expenditure as the dependent variable and there is only one cointegrating  
 259 equation in system.

260 **Table: 2**  
 261 **Johansen Cointegration Test**

Specifications	Hypothesised No. of Cointegrating Eq.	Trace Statistic	Max-Eigen Statistic	Outcome
ln (GE) = f (ln (GDP), ln (UP))	None	31.46** (24.28)	22.98** (17.79)	(1) Cointegrating Equation)
	At Most 1	8.47 (12.32)	8.35 (11.22)	
	At Most 2	0.13 (4.13)	013 (4.13)	

262 Note: Values in the parenthesis represents the critical value of the respective statistic at 0.05 level of  
 263 significance. \*\* and \*\*\* denote 5% and 1 % level of significance respectively.

#### 264 4.3. VECM Estimates for the Long-Run

265 As a corollary to the cointegration test, we have estimated the Vector Error Correction  
 266 Model (VECM) to estimate the long-run and the short-run coefficients of the independent  
 267 variables in the system. The results of the long-run estimates have been presented in table 3.

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**Table: 3**  
**Long-Run Estimates**

<b>Independent Variable</b>	<b>Specification (Dependent Variable: ln (GE))</b>
ln (GDP)	0.36** (0.16)
ln (UP)	3.75*** (0.41)
Constant	55.08
Cointeq	$\ln (GE) = 55.08(\text{Constant}) + 0.36(\ln (GDP)) + 3.75(\ln (UP))$

272 Note: \*\*\* and \*\*denotes 1% and 5 % level of significance, respectively. Values in parenthesis are the  
273 standard errors of the respective coefficients.

274 The results reveal that there is positive and statistically significant relationship  
275 between GDP and the public expenditure in long-run in context of India. In the long-run,  
276 each 1.0 percent increase in the GDP leads to about 0.36 percent increase in the public  
277 expenditure in India. This finding is in sync with the famous Wagner's law. According to the  
278 law, public expenditure is an increasing function of GDP in the modern welfare states. This  
279 finding shows that Wagner's law holds for India, at least in the long-run. Another variable,  
280 the urban population also has a positive and statistically significant effect on the public  
281 expenditure in India. Holding other things constant, every 1.0 percent increase in the urban  
282 population leads to about 3.75 percent increase in the public expenditure. Since urbanisation  
283 demands a unique set of public goods such as law and order, better sanitation and health  
284 facilities, street lightning, transport, and other infrastructure facilities, it makes it essential to  
285 increase the government expenditure on these heads. So, increasing urbanisation is associated  
286 with increasing public expenditure in India in the long-run and our results validate it.

#### 287 **4.4. VECM Estimates for the Short-Run**

288 The short-run results have been depicted in table 4. On the basis of the Akaike  
289 Information Criterion (AIC), a lag-length of 3 has been selected for the model. The results  
290 reveal that besides the government expenditure none of the variable has statistically  
291 significant effect on government expenditure in India.

292 In short-run, the government expenditure of the previous years has strong positive  
293 effect on government expenditure in current year. A 1.0 percent increase in government  
294 expenditure in the first, second and third lag is likely to increase government expenditure in  
295 the current year by 0.38 percent, 0.44 percent, and 0.44 percent, respectively. On the other  
296 hand, none of the dependent variables has statistically significant effect on government  
297 expenditure in the short-run, though they are main drivers of government expenditure in the  
298 long-run. The error-correction (ECM) term has the desired negative sign and it is statistically  
299 significant. The magnitude of the coefficient suggests a fairly high speed of adjustment in the  
300 aftermath of a shock. About 82.0 percent of disequilibria from a shock converge back to the  
301 long-run equilibrium within a year.

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**Table: 4**  
**Short-run estimates**

<b>Independent Variable</b>	<b>Specification (Dependent Variable: ln (GE))</b>
$\Delta \ln (GE)_{t-1}$	0.38* (0.21)
$\Delta \ln (GE)_{t-2}$	0.44** (0.20)
$\Delta \ln (GE)_{t-3}$	0.44** (0.21)
$\Delta \ln (GDP)_{t-1}$	-0.10 (0.30)
$\Delta \ln (GDP)_{t-2}$	0.05 (0.29)
$\Delta \ln (GDP)_{t-3}$	0.25 (0.30)
$\Delta \ln (UP)_{t-1}$	8.93 (12.08)
$\Delta \ln (UP)_{t-2}$	-24.58 (16.23)
$\Delta \ln (UP)_{t-3}$	-12.81 (12.22)
<i>Constant</i>	0.71** (0.26)
<i>ECM</i>	-0.82 (0.28)

308 Note: \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance, respectively. Values in parenthesis  
309 are the standard errors of the respective coefficients.

310 To sum up, it is public expenditure that explains variation in public expenditure in the  
311 short-run but GDP and urban population are major drivers of public expenditure in the long-  
312 run only.

#### 313 4.5. VECM Model Diagnostic Tests

314 The VECM model satisfies all the diagnostic tests and the results of these tests have  
315 been shown in the table 5. The probability value of the serial correlation LM test reveals that  
316 the model does not suffer from the problem of serial correlation as the test failed to reject the  
317 null hypothesis of no serial correlation.

318 **Table:5**  
319 **VECM Model Diagnostic Tests**

<b>Tests</b>	<b>Results</b>
Serial Correlation $\chi^2$ (3)	2.63 (0.97)
Heteroscedasticity $\chi^2$ (3)	135.63 (0.16)
Normality (Jarque-Bera) (3)	4.32 (0.63)

320 Note: Values in parenthesis are the p-values of the respective test statistic.

321 We have applied Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test to detect heteroscedasticity in the  
322 residuals of the model. The computed test statistic value and corresponding p-value (shown in

323 parenthesis) show that the residuals of the model are homoscedastic. Similarly, the Jarque-  
 324 Bera test statistic fails to reject the null hypothesis of normality of the residuals of the model.

325 **4.6. Causality test results**

326 At the end of the empirical exercise, Granger causality/Block exogeneity Wald test  
 327 has been applied in order to test for the causal relationship between the variables of interest.

328 **Table: 6**  
 329 **VAR Granger Causality/ Block Exogeneity Wald Test Results (Specification 1)**

Dependent Variable	Independent Variable	$\chi^2$
Δln (GE)	Δln (GDP)	0.99
	Δln (UP)	11.27***
	All	16.37***
Δln (GDP)	Δln (GE)	1.00
	Δln (UP)	1.12
	All	1.53
Δln (UP)	Δln (GE)	4.04
	Δln (GDP)	3.54
	All	6.83

330 Note: \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance, respectively.

331 The results have been shown in table 6. The results suggest unidirectional causality  
 332 between urban population and public expenditure running from urban population to public  
 333 expenditure. It implies that urban population granger causes government expenditure in India.  
 334 We did not find any sort of causality between GDP and public expenditure and GDP and  
 335 urban population.

336 **5. Conclusions and policy suggestions**

337 The results of Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) model reveal that both the GDP  
 338 and the urban population have a positive and statistically significant effect on government  
 339 expenditure in the long-run. Ceteris paribus, every 1.0 percent increase in GDP leads 0.36  
 340 percent increase in government expenditure. On the other hand, 1.0 percent increase in urban  
 341 population leads to a 3.75 percent increase in government expenditure. The Granger causality  
 342 results divulge that there is unidirectional causality running from urban population to  
 343 government expenditure, whereas neither unidirectional nor bidirectional causality was found  
 344 between GDP and public expenditure. In the short-run, neither GDP nor urban population  
 345 influences public expenditure.

346 To sum up, the present investigation provides support for Wagner's law in case of India  
 347 in the long run only. It has been found that urbanisation has a greater impact on public  
 348 expenditure than the national income (GDP) and which is also supported by Granger  
 349 causality test showing significant unidirectional causality running from level of urbanisation  
 350 to government expenditure. This causality does not exist between GDP and government  
 351 expenditure. Our results got support from previous studies like Hackl *et al.* (1993), Goffman  
 352 & Mahar (1971), Henning & Tussing (1974), Ganti & Kolluri (1979), Beck (1985), Vatter &  
 353 Walker (1986), Khan (1988), Ram (1987), Henrekson (1993) Verma & Arora (2010) who  
 354 found strong support for Wager's law in long run.

355 The overall empirical analysis for Indian scenario proves the long-run relationship  
 356 between economic growth and government expenditure and provides strong support for

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357 Wagner's law in post-liberalisation reform period for India. The empirical results do not  
358 support for any short-run impact of economic growth on government expenditure which  
359 confirms that increase in GDP does not have immediate impact on government expenditure  
360 or its activities. Being a developing nation India underwent a drastic sectoral transformation  
361 in post-liberalisation period which is connected to increased urbanisation. Still, the economy  
362 is mostly government-driven and this increase in government expenditure continues due to  
363 the provisions of social and economic welfare services.

#### 364 **Competing interests**

365 Authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

366

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