

Rising Sea Level, Receding Boundaries and Freezing Baselines in a Warming Climate

Abstract

This paper discusses the less publicised but far from less significant, an issue of how the international community's approach to maritime boundary delimitation will be impacted by climate change resulting in sea level rise with coastal lands submerging affecting the international boundaries and impacting on biodiversity and human survival in the future. The climate change effect is already creating pressure on international law regardless of the direction that the law of the sea takes in remedying this dilemma. It is quite apparent that global disputes and conflicts are arising and solutions are needed urgently. The climate change and the consequent global sea level rise are widely touted to submerge islands and coastlines without discrimination. The international community has been relatively slow to react to what could pose an unprecedented threat to human civilisation. The policies that have been applied have arguably been reactive and not proactive. In future climate change may develop other by-products which may not be understood at this moment and may require a proactive approach. Further discussion of the merits of the potential paths is ideal in ensuring that appropriate and well thought-out resolutions are negotiated. Regardless of the outcome, the thorough debate is required to ensure the correct decision is made and that the balancing act between fulfilling states' interests and achieving a meaningful result does not become detrimental to the solidity and the enforceability of the outcome. There is a need to establish a comprehensive framework for ocean governance for management and long-term development and sustainability.

Keywords: Rising sea level, receding boundaries and freezing baselines

I INTRODUCTION

The Industrial Revolution is often held to be one of the most influential periods in recent economic and social effects occurring roughly 250 years ago. But this rings true in an environmental context as well. The impact of human activities during this period (*Anthropocene* period) represents a figurative blip on the radar of the earth's existence, yet

35 arguably has the most significant effect on the earth ecosystems.² There is irrefutable
36 evidence that, the coastlines of the future will differ greatly to the coastlines of today. This is
37 not necessarily a new phenomenon. Scientific studies illuminate that sea levels have been
38 greatly variable throughout the existence of oceans on Earth. But it was in the 18th and
39 19th Centuries that humans began to have an undue influence on the rate at which the
40 sea was rising. Since this time, thirst for fossil fuels has had the undesirable effect of greatly
41 contributing to CO₂ and methane gases emissions and depleting the ozone layer. NASA
42 climate scientist, Jim Hansen, has stated that the “greatest threat of climate change for
43 human beings lies in the potential destabilization of the massive ice sheets in Greenland and
44 Antarctica.³ The accelerated breaking up of these ice sheets has been widely scientifically
45 linked to anthropogenic climate change, and this essay will, therefore, continue without
46 much further debate on this topic. The notion of unstable coastlines was evidently
47 contemplated by the drafters of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
48 (UNCLOS 1982). Specifically, article 7(2)⁴ expressly considers this idea. Bird and
49 Prescott suggest that this should indicate some degree of foresight regarding sea level rise in
50 the treaty.⁵ There is some literature proposing that there is a “negative implication” under
51 UNCLOS that when a feature becomes submerged, baselines would have to be redrawn to
52 reflect this.⁶ The same would apply to islands that lose their capacity to fall under the
53 definition of island as per article 121(3) of UNCLOS 1982.⁷ Coastlines were well
54 acknowledged to be a dynamic feature, but it could perhaps be suggested that there is a
55 minute element of contradiction in the placement of “appropriate points” in order to establish
56 a coastal state’s maritime zones.¹⁰ This statement is not designed to criticise the current
57 regime, as it has clearly been a serviceable approach to the definition of maritime
58 boundaries and zones since its inception and pragmatism may invite a level of hypocrisy.
59 However, in a physically changing world, a new regime may be required to affront the
60 situation at hand. What this regime will constitute is a source of some divisiveness.

61 In a world where the sea levels are rising and it is almost universally acknowledged that,
62 due to the lag in the planet’s response to human impacts, even if significant reduction to
63 CO₂ emissions were made overnight, the effect of such changes would not be
64 noticeable until many years later.⁸ As consumption of fossil fuels continues to increase,
65 it is clear that the challenges that currently face humankind are only going to get worse
66 before they get better.⁹ This has led to widespread calls for clarity and certainty for the

67 potentially turbulent decades/centuries to come. This may come in the form of the
68 ‘freezing’ of baseline; a somewhat ironic term seeing as it is the warming of the planet that
69 may necessitate these changes. These calls for the freezing of baselines, as mentioned
70 earlier, deviates from the traditional 20th century approach to maritime boundary
71 delimitation. It also somewhat contradicts that the prevailing notion of ambulatory
72 baselines. One of the core concepts of maritime law is that the points which determine how
73 a maritime boundary is drawn will be subject to change to reflect their physical position.
74 With sea level rises expected to be anywhere up to a meter¹⁰, even by “conservative”
75 estimates¹¹, the predominant argument in favour of freezing baselines as they are (or were)
76 at a particular date aims at providing much needed consistency in a field that has been
77 lacking in this quality in recent times.¹²

78
79 Natural resource acquisition and distribution have on modern international politics that has
80 a predominant factor, whether expressly mentioned or as an ulterior motive in the majority
81 of international maritime boundary disputes. As resources diminish and once plentiful
82 reserves are exhausted, it is safe to say that competition will only grow.¹³ Resources are
83 bountiful in oceans and seas around the globe and may provide expansive economic
84 benefit for the state in whose possession the area resides. With this in mind, maximisation
85 of the territory is always at the forefront of any rational state's international agenda.
86 Applying a realist approach to this issue, states will endeavour to fulfil their own national
87 interests, often at the expense of other states, and there should be no inherent negative to
88 this because states have the right to do this. On the contrary, if these national interests can
89 be attained in a manner that adheres to global norms and legal requirements, there
90 ought to be no stigma attached to these goals. However, even in a field that is mostly
91 governed by overarching legislation, there continue to be inter-state disputes that, in
92 the modern diplomacy, have the potential to already simmering tensions between these
93 states.¹⁴ One of the most prevalent of these is the Sino-Japanese relations in recent
94 decades. There have long been disagreements between China and Japan, and along with
95 these disagreements comes a persistent fear that these disputes may boil over into more
96 serious conflicts in a region seen by many to be a volatile one. The importance of
97 maintaining stability in this region often goes under-appreciated. Particular attention is
98 often paid to the clusters of islands and nearby low-tide elevations in the South China
99 Sea known as the Spratly Islands (in the southern area of the sea) and the Parcel

100 islands (to the north). But there is also the Okino-tori Shima dispute in the Philippine Sea,
101 which poses a more direct threat to Sino-Japanese relations than the two island groups
102 mentioned earlier.¹⁵ This low-lying reef has the capacity of generating significant EEZ
103 rights, but there is scepticism around whether or not these structures should possess this
104 capacity and Japan has spent an estimated \$600 million in ‘strengthening’ the reef
105 and ensuring it remains above tide.¹⁶ This “manipulation of international law”¹⁷ is,
106 however, at risk of being made inconsequential in the wake of a rising sea. The reef is
107 likely to be wholly inundated in the relatively near future owing to its extremely low height
108 above sea level. Japan's tentative claim to the reef, and its subsequent EEZ entitlements
109 adds an extra dimension to the dilemma¹⁸. Sea level rise could alter maritime boundaries is
110 that some islands that support baselines and maritime boundaries could be rendered
111 uninhabitable by the effects of sea level rise. This could see these islands reclassified as
112 ‘rocks’ that can no longer sustain ‘human habitation or economic life’¹⁹. Sea level rise
113 presents a significant threat to international security which needs to be given appropriate
114 attention and concern. As existing boundaries are rendered uncertain, inter-state disputes and
115 conflict will likely evolve²⁰. This paper discusses the less publicised but far from less
116 significant, an issue of how the international community’s approach to maritime boundary
117 delimitation will be impacted by climate change resulting in sea level rise with coastal lands
118 submerging affecting the international boundaries and impacting on biodiversity and human
119 survival in the future

120

121 **II FIXED BASELINES: BUSINESS AS USUAL**

122 As mentioned earlier, coastlines have long been held to be ambulatory in nature, and this
123 has not been challenged to any significant extent since the implementation of UNCLOS in
124 1982. However, it is clear that a very real challenge is being posted to this existing regime
125 by global warming. There are two prevailing schools of thought regarding the future of
126 maritime boundary delimitation: that the existing regime ought to continue to be in
127 force, or that, in order to provide future consistency, baselines should be ‘frozen’.
128 Although there is evidently a shifting of support away from the existing regime to the latter
129 of these options, it would be naïve to discuss the dilemma without due consideration to
130 maintaining the existing regime. When provided with two such distinct options, in the
131 majority of cases the status quo in international law is the preferred path when pitted
132 against change. This is because the world thrives on stability and certainty. Ambulatory

133 coasts have been a tried and true concept in law and, whilst not always perfect, has
134 provided the consistency that strengthens international law.¹⁹ As global warming
135 continues to take its toll on both the social and economic facets of society, perhaps
136 maintaining a consistent maritime order is the best way to assist in achieving global
137 stability.²²The importance of this branch of international law in contributing to this stability
138 is often underplayed. So, therefore, it appears that one key question arises: Is this
139 consistency to be achieved through a business as usual approach, or would it be better
140 achieved through making the baselines themselves consistent by freezing them?

141 In 1994, UNCLOS, the preeminent treaty in the existing framework, finally came into
142 effect; 21 years after the third United Nations Conference on this matter was convened. In
143 fact, we are closer in time to UNCLOS coming into effect, than Arvin Pardo's seminal
144 1967 speech was. His urging to avoid "escalating tension" are reminiscent of what could
145 occur in a future of maritime boundary uncertainty.²³ This time frame also illustrates the
146 sheer length of time often involved in devising international conventions. It is also
147 notoriously difficult to garner the support of a sufficient number of states to make an
148 international convention worthwhile.²⁴

149 In attempting to maximise involvement in a regime of frozen baselines, the agreement
150 could be at risk of becoming too compromised and diluted as states aim to get the best deal
151 and protect their national interests.²⁵ States would approach this opportunity tentatively,
152 and it must be acknowledged that some states could potentially have a net disadvantage
153 under the new proposal. disputes may be settled by a new regime, but to the detriment
154 of one state. And in the world of maritime boundary delimitation where losing possession
155 of even a small coral reef could mean losing 150,000 square miles of its exclusive
156 economic zone,²⁶ a cautious approach to reform is entirely understandable. It has even been
157 suggested that Bangladesh, in the event of a 1.5m rise in sea level, would have
158 extended access to a number of oil and gas reserves in the Bay of Bengal assuming their
159 practice of using straight baselines is legally permitted in such circumstances.²⁷ A
160 stronger opposing argument could be made, however, that Bangladesh would not really be
161 benefitting in this situation as its capital Dhaka would be at risk of being submerged.²⁸
162 Even a meter sea level rise would flood 17% of Bangladesh's land mass,²³ resulting in mass
163 displacement¹⁵ and loss of fertile arable land. Factoring in the increase of severity in
164 weather events would only exacerbate the losses suffered by such low-lying coastal states.
165 It must be remembered that a rising sea will not discriminate between states. Whereas

166 China may benefit from Japan losing Okino-tori Shima, Shanghai would also be at risk of
167 being flooded. Perhaps when factoring in these details, a unanimous consensus may not be
168 unattainable after all. A status quo approach is arguably ignorant to the fact that the climate
169 is changing, and the world would benefit if international law could keep up with this
170 change.

171 There is also a claim that states will suffer significant economic costs in fixing boundaries
172 as opposed to allowing them to remain ambulatory. This is tied to the costs involved in
173 developing accurate charts and precise satellite imagery that reflects their new ‘frozen’
174 boundaries. As Caron argues, however, the costs associated with maintaining
175 “uncertain boundaries” could very well offset these merely monetary expenses. The risk
176 of “eternal litigation” increases with ambulatory baselines, and with this, the
177 aforementioned global stability that is so desired is threatened. In addition to these claims
178 of extensive costs, it can be argued that the “wasteful spending”²⁰ undertaken by Japan in
179 protecting Okino-tori Shima justifies having the boundaries frozen. Perhaps not
180 specifically for this particularly tentative claim, but for other low-tide elevations and
181 drying reefs that risk being submerged in the coming decades, the freezing of boundaries
182 could prove to be a more affordable choice than attempting to ensure that their low-lying
183 objects can support the economic activity required for it to maintain its status under
184 UNCLOS.²⁷ The case of Okino-tori Shima bears a resemblance to the United Kingdom’s
185 claim to Rockall – which as the name suggests, is not much more than a large exposed
186 granite rock in the North Atlantic Ocean – in 1955. In this case, the UK was attempting to
187 maintain its claim to Rockall’s EEZ, but upon its ratification to UNCLOS in 1997, this
188 was no longer possible. The UK had a period where they stationed royal guards there in a
189 display of their claim, but this was evidently fruitless. As is common- place in international
190 law, states will go to seemingly illogical lengths to protect their national interests. While
191 Rockall will not be at risk of submergence for quite some time, there are clear
192 similarities between the UK’s actions and Japan’s protection of its reef.

193 **IV FREEZING BASELINES: THE BEST WA FORWARD**

194 The majority of academic literature on this topic is clearly in favour of a shift away
195 from what has been the norm for coastal states utilising the straight baseline system
196 under UNCLOS 1982. Evolving to a regime of freezing baselines has, in the grand scheme
197 of climate change, been a relatively recent development. For that matter, reacting to climate
198 change has been a comparatively recent development. This is a blight on the international

199 community and it may have permitted the situation to worsen to an irreversible
200 extent. Despite this, action can and should still be taken to resolve the issues that appear
201 almost universally in every facet of civilisation and the environment. There is a level of
202 irony that, in freezing baselines, states are shoring up their ability to exploit natural
203 resources; an activity that has undoubtedly help to create the predicament that necessitates
204 this action. This notion has to be weighed up against the aforementioned idea of global
205 stability. But it appears that this approach would resolve many issues that have plagued the
206 international community, and more consistent proposed regime.²⁰ The most obvious
207 benefit to be had in freezing baselines would be the consistency and certainty it would
208 entail. Once states agreed on their boundaries, there would be no real reason for many
209 more disputes to arise.¹⁶ Once the reform has settled along with the disputes that had arisen
210 out of the reform or any pre-existing disputes, it would be difficult to foresee states
211 possessing the opportunity to concoct new disputes. Clearly this is an idealistic view, but
212 there is a large degree of truth to the statement that consistency breeds stability.³⁰ If states
213 are all in a grievance on their maritime boundaries again a difficult task in itself – then there
214 will be a definite reduction in major flare-ups that could threaten geopolitical stability in
215 places like Asia this stability is so direly required.

216
217 The concept of fairness and equity could also be a victor if this change were to come into
218 force.¹³ In an ideal situation, the reform would be a sweeping one, where all those
219 boundaries agreed upon at a certain date to be in force indefinitely. Fittingly, just as global
220 warming does not discriminate against states, neither should these reforms. The question
221 then arises: how would such a reform be devised and enacted? Naturally, different parties
222 would want different outcomes. This could complicate any planned legislative reform. In
223 addition to this, any proposed reform would be far-reaching and could undermine or at least
224 contradict a large part of UNCLOS and the other components of the over-arching law of the
225 sea framework. This could lead to another major overhaul of maritime law similar to
226 that experienced in the middle to late 20th century. Caron, however, summarises his
227 arguments by saying that fixing boundaries would be equitable as “it preserves the
228 allocation of authority over the oceans”, a system which is deemed to be rather fair.²³

229
230 What would be required to bring this change to fruition would be convening an open
231 meeting under the auspices of the United Nations with a maximisation of involvement to

232 ensure that all points of view are heard and understood and to ensure widespread
233 consistency and equity is achieved to the best of their ability. This is no easy achievement
234 and it should not be expected that a panacea-type outcome will be reached within a short
235 time-frame. Beginning of discussions, however, should take place as soon as practicable.
236 The benefits of such an overhaul to the existing system and analyse. There will
237 undoubtedly be a fair share of opponents to an approach that could be seen as quite an
238 altruistic sacrifice by some parties. Expecting states to commit to such an endeavour
239 would be somewhat optimistic, to say the least, but in order to minimise future disputes
240 coming from this proposal, this is the possibly the most suitable avenue. Bird and
241 Prescott suggest an alternative policy that could be employed by coastal states which they
242 term “masterly inactivity”.³¹ This would entail effectively not reacting and leaving the
243 boundaries as they are through a sort of implied agreement. This would likely prove a risky
244 strategy as states would not be under any real obligation to not re-evaluate their baseline. It
245 could also contribute to inequity as a state may choose to re-evaluate their boundaries if it
246 suits their own interests, which may impinge or impede on another state’s interests,
247 which in turn would carry an undesirable potential for conflict.

248 The most preferred path, in order to ensure a strongly concretised regime, would be for
249 either an amendment to relevant treaties, an entirely new treaty to be developed and
250 brought into force. There is an unfortunate expectation with international law, however, that
251 such grand revisions of existing practices would take a substantial amount of time, and in
252 such circumstances where a decade could mean sea level rise of anywhere between an inch
253 and a foot, an expeditious resolution should be at the top of the agenda of the international
254 community. This could mean some compromises on significant points, but the importance
255 of this proposed regime should not be underestimated. The certainty that it could provide
256 for the decades and centuries to come would be invaluable. Perhaps in the interim period,
257 an approach similar to the freezing of sovereignty claims in Antarctica could be taken
258 while the international community gathers itself to perfect a more viable long-term
259 method.¹³

260

261 **CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS**

262 In conclusion, it is clear that the earth will continue to reveal the full extent of the
263 detrimental impact we have had on it. While this all unfolds, what is required is ‘proactive
264 responsiveness’ in all affected fields. As has been said numerous times, the effects of

265 climate change are not isolated to one facet of life. They are far-reaching and non-
266 discriminatory. Despite this gloomy outlook, there is one issue, the resolution of which is
267 well within the capabilities of the international community. The inflaming of tensions that
268 are already at boiling point is one indirect impact that climate change will undeniably
269 have in the form of its effect on maritime boundaries. Avoidance of conflict is always to be
270 strived for to ensure a harmonious planet, especially when competition for ocean
271 resources increases. As the effects of global warming become clearer, an element that
272 the international community can control is political stability and genuine efforts should be
273 made to achieve this goal. The most 'accessible' option may be a hybrid approach that best
274 satisfies the majority of states' desires and this should be acceptable as long as it provides
275 consistency. Regardless of the outcome, the thorough debate is required to ensure the
276 correct decision is made and that the balancing act between fulfilling states' interests and
277 achieving a meaningful result does not become detrimental to the solidity and the
278 enforceability of the outcome. There is a need to establish a comprehensive framework for
279 ocean governance for management and long-term development and sustainability. This
280 involves Reformulating and re-evaluating of policies, legislative framework and concept for
281 the governance of the ocean spaces and marine resources for effective governance of
282 resources within the maritime zone and lastly, reviews of the out-dated law, policies with
283 criteria involving stakeholder, review based on scientific data and well spelt out the
284 responsibility of agencies.

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