

# **Determinants of Microfinance Loan default: An empirical investigation in Sri Lanka**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Microfinance aims to promote sustainable economic empowerment and capacity building to people in the developing countries. However, in recent times microfinance has captured the attention of a large audience as a system that is unmonitored, uncontrolled and irresponsible. Local and international literature continuously highlighted that microfinance loan default has implications not only at the micro economic level but also at the macroeconomic level. With this factor in mind, this research aims to explore factors influencing microfinance loans in Sri Lanka. Both a deductive and a quantitative approach were employed in this research. A structured questionnaire was distributed among microfinance loan borrowers in the region of the Matugama Divisional Secretariat. The findings of this study confirmed that in microfinance institutes' strategies to control loan defaulting, the borrowers' family and group and macro-economic issues influenced loan defaulting of Sri Lankan microfinance customers. The findings of this study could be used by managers of MF institutes in issues such as managing risk and customer portfolio, access to CRIB, and requesting securities before granting a loan. Microfinance trainers could use these findings to design their training and consultation activities for loan borrowers. This knowledge would help borrowers to manage their loan risk while not facing the poverty trap.

*Keywords:* Microfinance, Loan default, Sri Lanka, Matugama Divisional Secretariat, Developing country

## **1. INTRODUCTION**

The term "microfinance (MF)" refers to the provision of financial services to low-income clients, including the self-employed [1,2]. In the last few decades, many developing countries have seen some transformation of their financial system experience with the advent of Microfinance Institutions (MFI). Mungure [3] observed that MFIs were established to provide micro loans, savings, business advice and training to Micro and Small Enterprises (MSEs). Particularly MFIs were marked by poverty-related missions to help the poor access loans from financing MSEs [4].

There were 123 million MFI customers worldwide by 2016 with India as the leader in terms of MF in 2016 [5]. The ranking shows a strong impetus in South Asia while Latin America and the Caribbean are also highly active in the field of microfinance. According to Daily fit-[6], there is a credit gap of \$2.5 to \$3.58 billion between licensed financial institutions and potential customer needs in Sri Lanka. Hence, microfinance institutions must contribute to bridge this gap.

32 The sustainability of MFIs heavily depends on the ability to collect their loans efficiently and  
33 effectively. The repercussions of loan defaults on MFIs include the inability to disburse more  
34 loans in future, reducing operating profits and undermining liquidity. Despite the growth of  
35 microfinance in Sri Lanka, MFIs face default problems which are a serious challenge to the  
36 sustainability of MFIs. If loan arrears persist, poverty-related problems can increase rather  
37 than decrease. Recently, many experiences faced in Sri Lanka confirm and demonstrate the  
38 seriousness of this problem in the MF sector. MF has already been banned in the Northern  
39 Province by the government due to the ongoing conflicts in poverty reduction. Hence, there  
40 is an urgent need to investigate the factors affecting microfinance loan defaults in Sri Lanka.  
41 This study aims to identify and analyze the factors influencing MF loan default in Sri Lanka.  
42 MF plays a significant role in poverty alleviation, rural development, gender equality (through  
43 women empowerment) and quality education which is considered key goals of sustainable  
44 development. Therefore, a study of the microfinance sector and loan default is critical for  
45 development as a whole. The current study will serve as a useful reference document for  
46 loan policy developers, potential investors, government authorities and other stakeholders in  
47 identifying and solving this issue.

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## 50 **2. LITERATURE REVIEW**

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### 52 **2.1 Microfinance**

53 Microfinance is a financial transactions service that offers financial assistance to  
54 unemployed or low-income individuals or groups deprived of access to financial services.  
55 According to Kaoma [7], the main aim of microfinance is to eradicate poverty and empower  
56 women. These two aspects are also recognized as two of the major millennium development  
57 goals.

58 Professor Yunus started his Grameen Banks to alleviate poverty by providing small loans to  
59 his country's rural destitute [2]. This initial process was begun as an experiment in the  
60 outskirts of Chittagong University in the village of Jobra, Bangladesh. Its objective was to  
61 grant loans to the rural poor without collateral at full-cost interest repayable in regular  
62 instalments [8].

63 Later, the Grameen Banks confirmed that its customers subscribe to a basic list of ways that  
64 the poor can improve their living status. In appreciation of this great work, in 2006 the Nobel  
65 Peace Prize was awarded to both Professor Yunus and the Grameen Bank for their  
66 contribution to developing the concept of microfinance.

67 Microfinance originated as a self-financing model to provide social benefits to the rural poor.  
68 However, now it has changed into business models which enable the poor to earn an  
69 income while enjoying social benefits.

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### 71 **2.2 Sri Lankan MF Context**

72 As a developing country, Sri Lanka has a long history of a fundamental system of  
73 microfinance. "Cheetu" in Sri Lanka has been operating at least from the beginning of early  
74 20th century. MF is still considered as an informal but effective way of capital accumulation  
75 and saving. However, it functioned as a basic method of MF for the poor. The microfinance  
76 sector in Sri Lanka now covers a wide range of institutions and products and provides a  
77 significant mode of financial inclusion and empowerment for the low income and poor  
78 sections of society.

79 In Sri Lanka, MF has a long history and today a large number of institutions provide  
80 microfinance services, particularly to the poorest households [9]. These institutions include  
81 licensed commercial banks, licensed finance companies, co-operative rural banks, thrift and  
82 credit co-operatives societies, Divinaguma banks, other community-based organizations,  
83 microfinance companies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Some of these  
84 intuitions are regulated by different authorities such as the Central Bank of Sri Lanka,

85 Department of Cooperative Development and the Department of Divinaguma Development.  
86 Almost 200 MF organizations are operating in the country, out of which only 100 MF  
87 organizations are identified as having an established country-wide network.  
88 Some impostors are pretending to be microfinance companies in Sri Lanka engaged in  
89 business activities that seem to be MF and charge high-interest rates from its customers that  
90 would lead poor people to further distress. Most of the time customers blame and complain  
91 against these types of illegal microfinance companies adversely affecting their goodwill.

92 It is argued in the literature that the greater the concern for microfinance institutions (MFIs)  
93 aiming for financial sustainability, the lesser the impact on poverty reduction, and hence  
94 there is a tradeoff between outreach to the poor and financial sustainability [10]. It has also  
95 been argued that the microfinance institutions (MFIs) are more concerned about their  
96 financial sustainability rather than reducing poverty. Hence, there is a tradeoff between  
97 outreach (the ability of MF institutes to reach poor remote people) and its sustainability  
98 (ability to cover its operating costs). Therefore, there is a need to regulate and supervise the  
99 microfinance institutions in Sri Lanka. Parliament enacted the Microfinance Act No. 6 of 2016  
100 which came into effect on 15<sup>th</sup> July, 2016. It provides for licensing, supervising and  
101 regulating microfinance business known as licensed microfinance companies (LMFCs). Non-  
102 governmental microfinance organizations are registered under Act No. 31 of 1980 (VSSO  
103 Act) by the Registrar of Voluntary Social Service Organizations (CBSL).

### 104 **2.3 Loan Defaults**

105 Default refers to a situation where a borrower fails to repay a loan. According to Mensah [11]  
106 and Gatimu [12] arrears refer to a late payment, partial payment or a skipped payment.  
107 When repayment is delayed, a loan is considered as a delinquent loan which loan turns into  
108 default where the chance of recovering the loan becomes minimal. Delinquency shows  
109 increased risk of loss and a warning against operational problems so that measuring  
110 delinquency becomes very important.

111 The reasons for MF loan default could differ with borrowers assigning one set of factors and  
112 loan officers in the field assigning another set. A study conducted by Addae-Korankye [13]  
113 found that factors assigned by borrowers are not the main reasons for loan default.  
114 Therefore, loan officers need to be vigilant to minimize the risk of loan default. Further,  
115 Mungure [3] emphasized that most loan defaults are not only by bad borrowers; MFIs are  
116 also known to have contributed to loan default.

117 High-interest rates and delays in loan delivery could significantly increase transaction costs  
118 and also adversely affect repayment performance [14]. Loan shortages, disbursement lag,  
119 small farm size, high-interest rate, age of farmers and poor supervision have been identified  
120 as the major reasons for loan default [15]. According to the study conducted by Sheila [16],  
121 inadequate financial analysis is another cause of microfinance loan default.

122 Kohansal [17] showed that the income of farmers in the Kohansan-Razavi province of Iran  
123 has a positive effect on loan repayment while loan interest and the number of instalments  
124 have a negative effect on loan repayment performance. According to a study conducted by  
125 Waweru [18] in Kenya, most of the causes of loan default with MFIs and failure to manage  
126 self-help groups (SHGs). Management of a business is vital while poor business practice is  
127 another reason for loan default. According to Besley, a positive consequence is that  
128 successful group members may have a motivation to repay the loans of group members  
129 whose projects have yielded insufficient returns to make repayment worthwhile. The  
130 negative effect rises when the entire group defaults, even when some members would have  
131 repaid individual loans.

132 In addition, macro-economic factors also need to be considered. A study done by Waweru  
133 [18] illustrates that some of the reasons behind loan default in Kenyan banks were national  
134 economic downturn and reduced consumer purchasing power. Thus, price levels and  
135 economic growth are very important in assessing the loan repayment ability of recipients.

136 According to Kwakwa [20] real Gross Domestic Product decline and depreciation of the  
137 foreign exchange rate directly affect the repayment ability of borrowers. Furthermore, Fofack  
138 [21] stated that macroeconomic stability and economic growth are associated with  
139 diminishing loan default. Accordingly, the goal of achieving a minimum loan default to ensure  
140 a healthy loan portfolio will ultimately lead to the sustainability of MFIs.  
141 According to prior studies, MF institutional factors, factors of family and MF loan group and  
142 macroeconomic factors have been identified as the major causes of loan default in this  
143 study.

144

### 145 **3. STUDY DESIGN**

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147 Most international, as well as national studies, have referred to qualitative approaches to  
148 exploring the factors influencing microfinance loan default. However, this study used the  
149 quantitative approach that expects to identify the factors affecting microfinance loan default  
150 in Sri Lanka with specific reference to the Matugama Divisional Secretariat, which was  
151 selected because it is one of the districts that obtained the highest number of MF loans in Sri  
152 Lanka.

153 Since the population of this study comprised MF loan borrowers in the geographical region  
154 of Matugama a convenience sampling method was used. Convenience sampling is one of  
155 the main types of non-probability sampling methods and refers to the collection of  
156 information from members of the population who are conveniently available to the  
157 researcher for the data that the researcher is seeking.

158 Even though data collection started with convenience sampling, after interviewing the  
159 respondents, their references were used to identify other respondents. Therefore, at the  
160 latter stage of the study, the snowball sampling method was used. A total of 133  
161 respondents were selected among 7 Gender studies (GNDs) under the Divisional Secretariat  
162 of Matugama to collect the data required for the study.

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#### 164 **3.1 Data Collection**

165 Structured questionnaires consisting of close-ended questions were developed in line with  
166 the objectives of the study. They included the income of the family, size of the family, and  
167 educational qualifications and demographic factors according to previous studies and  
168 literature [22; 13; 23]. A five-point Likert scale was used to identify microfinance institutional  
169 factors, macro-economic factors and factors of MF group and family that could impact on  
170 microfinance loan default. The language and wording of the questionnaire were aimed to  
171 elicit the responses of as MF loan borrowers. Generally, they have a low education level,  
172 poor English and use of idiom. Thus the questionnaire was designed in Sinhala and for  
173 analysis; all data and information were translated into English.

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#### 175 **3.2 Data Analysis**

176 The data analysis was conducted using SPSS version 22. To analyze and present the data,  
177 a descriptive analysis was done. The internal consistency of the study instruments and  
178 instrument subscales was measured using Cronbach's alpha. The factor analysis was done  
179 using the principal axis factoring method to ensure construct validity.

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### 181 **4. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS**

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#### 183 **4.1 Demographic Profile of the Sample**

184 The data was collected from 133 microfinance loan borrowers. The 133 questionnaires did  
185 not have any missing value or invalid response. As for age, 38.3% of the respondents  
186 belong to the age category of more than 45 years and considered mature. The next highest  
187 age category of 31-40 years formed 24.8% of the total respondents while 18-30 years and  
188 31-40 years categories were 19.5% and 17.3% respectively. The majority of microfinance

189 borrowers who participated in the study had five family members including the respondent  
 190 (30.1%) while the next number of members was 4 and 6 representing 22.6% and 21.8%  
 191 respectively. Those with 2 family members represented 7.5% while those with 8 family  
 192 members represented 0.8% including the respondent. The educational profile of the  
 193 respondents indicated that the majority of respondents had completed Grade 9 and formed  
 194 51.9% of the total while 40.6% of respondents had qualifications up to GCE (O/L). Only one  
 195 graduate respondent (08. %) had obtained MF loans while 6.8% respondents had completed  
 196 GCE (A/L). In respect of average monthly income, as many as 51.5% of respondents were in  
 197 the income range of Rs.10, 000 – 30,000. The next highest income range was Rs.30, 000 -  
 198 Rs 50,000 earned by a percentage of 32.3%. Those in the income range of less than Rs. 10,  
 199 000 and more than Rs 50, 000 were less than those in other income ranges -4.5% and  
 200 12.0% respectively. The study further focused on borrowers who are members of the  
 201 microfinance loan group. Most of the microfinance loan groups consisted of five members,  
 202 that is, 54.5% of the total. Here we identified another two groups of 3 and 4 members  
 203 respectively who represented 28.6% and 16.5% respectively of the total sample.  
 204

205 **4.2 MF Loans**

206 The main focus was on identifying the actual purpose of borrowing rather than the purpose  
 207 stated in the loan application. To repair/build a house accounted for a high percentage, that  
 208 is, 36.8% while 11.3% of respondents had obtained loans to start a new business and 21.8%  
 209 to expand their existing business. However, the second-highest percentage 30.1% of  
 210 borrowers obtained loans to settle existing loans.  
 211

212 Next, the study focused on the current status of MF group loans in order to identify the trend  
 213 of loan defaults. The majority of respondents (87.2%) had repaid their loans themselves and  
 214 3% had repaid their loans through group members rather than by the borrowers themselves.  
 215 There were some cases (9.8%) where both borrowers and group members repaid the MF  
 216 loans.  
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218 **4.3 MF institutional factors (MFI)**

219 Seven statements in the survey instrument were intended to measure MFI. The KMO value  
 220 was 0.709 and p-value of Bartlett's test of Sphericity (Chi-square=221.155, df= 21) was  
 221 significant (P< 0.05). The analysis confirmed that the two-factor solution with a Cronbach's  
 222 alpha of 0.741 confirmed that these statements were a reliable measure of the MFI  
 223 construct. However, it was identified that the first of the two factors led to MFI consisted of  
 224 the statements in the questionnaire MF12, MF14, MF13, and MF15 while MF12 led the group  
 225 with its highest contribution. The second factor of the MF factor consisted of MF16, MF17 and  
 226 MF11 while MF16 led with the highest contribution. In summary, 56.82% of the variance of the  
 227 MFI construct was explained through the seven statements which were divided into two  
 228 factors (Table 1).  
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**Table 1: Explanatory factor analysis for MFI**

| Item label | Statement   | Factor loading |   | Cronbach's alpha | % variance |
|------------|---|----------------|---|------------------|------------|
|            |   | Component      |   |                  |            |
|            |   | 1              | 2 |                  |            |
| MF12       | MF Institute has approved adequate advances/loans                                 | 0.851          |   | 0.741            | 56.82      |
| MF14       | I am satisfied with the procedures that MF institute followed to approve the loan | 0.767          |   | Chapter 1        |            |

|      |   |       |           |           |
|------|---|-------|-----------|-----------|
| MF13 | The loan was granted at the right time I expected   | 0.761 |           | Chapter 2 |
| MF15 | When I applied for the loan, MF institute estimated my total debt   | 0.436 |           |           |
| MF16 | MF institute suggested to me a simple and easy instalment payment method                                      |       | 0.82<br>0 | Chapter 3 |
| MF17 | MF institute arranged workshops, technical instructions and financial knowledge, after they granted me a loan |       | 0.69<br>7 | Chapter 4 |
| MF11 | The Interest rate of the MF Institute of my choice is more attractive than of the other institute             |       | 0.64<br>8 |           |

231 Overall (Annexure 1), majority of respondents disagreed with statement that *the interest rate*  
232 *of the MF institute of their choice is more attractive than of another institute*. However, most  
233 of the respondents who had defaulted group loans disagreed with the statement and also the  
234 majority of those who hadn't defaulted the MF group loans also disagreed with the  
235 statement. Most of the respondents agreed that the *MF institute had approved adequate*  
236 *loans*, according to the overall result. But most of the respondents who had defaulted MF  
237 group loans were neutral and disagreed with this statement. The overall result was mostly  
238 dependent in the responses of those ones who hadn't defaulted since most of them had  
239 agreed or strongly agreed with the statement. From the overall responses, most of the  
240 participants agreed that the *loan was granted at the right time they expected*. However, that  
241 was mostly affected by the responses of those who hadn't defaulted. The majority of  
242 respondents who had defaulted disagreed with the statement that the loan was not granted  
243 at the right time they expected. Overall, the respondents were satisfied with the *procedure*  
244 *that MFI followed to approve loans*. However, the majority of respondents who had defaulted  
245 were not satisfied with the procedures followed. The overall result differs because most of  
246 the borrowers who hadn't defaulted agreed with the statement. Overall, the majority of them  
247 agreed that the *MF institute had estimated their total debt before approving the loan*. Even  
248 though those who had defaulted are neutral on this statement, the overall result is influenced  
249 by the responses of those who hadn't defaulted; the majority of them agreed with the  
250 statement. According to the overall result, the majority disagreed with the statement that the  
251 *MF institute suggested a simple and easy instalment method*. Considering the respondents  
252 who had defaulted on MF group loans, most of them disagreed with this statement while  
253 most of them who hadn't defaulted agreed with the same statement. Most of the  
254 respondents strongly disagreed and disagreed with the statement that *MFI had not arranged*  
255 *workshops and training programme after they had granted them a loan*. Considering results  
256 separately, the majority of those who had defaulted and those who hadn't defaulted  
257 disagreed with the statement.

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#### 4.4 Influence of Family (F)

Table 2 gives the result of the factor analysis of the four items identified as measuring the factors of family and the MF loan group. The KMO value was 0.681 and p-value of Bartlett's test of Sphericity (Chi-square=79.987, df= 6) was significant (P< 0.05). Cronbach's alpha of 0.665 also confirmed that they were reliable measures of family influence. Also, F2 was the most significant item leading to the family influence constructs. In summary, these four statements explained 50.31% of the variance of family influence.

**Table 2: Explanatory factor analysis for influence of family**

| Item label | Statement  | Factor loading | Cronbach's alpha | % variance |
|------------|--|----------------|------------------|------------|
| F2         | My family members help me to settle the loans.                             | 0.808          | 0.665            | 50.31      |
| F1         | I think, my total family income is sufficient to settle future total debt. | 0.751          |                  |            |
| F4         | My group members encourage me to pay the loan instalments on the due date. | 0.668          |                  |            |
| F3         | Members of the loan group support me to manage the credit.                 | 0.590          |                  |            |

269 According to the overall result (Annexure 1) most of the respondents thought *their total*  
 270 *family income was sufficient to settle their remaining total debt*; they agreed with the  
 271 statement. However, the majority of respondents who had defaulted MF group loans  
 272 disagreed with the above statement while the majority of respondents who hadn't defaulted  
 273 MF group loans agreed with the said statement. Most of the respondents agreed and  
 274 strongly agreed with the statement that *their family members help to settle their loans*.  
 275 According to those who had defaulted MF group loans, the majority agreed with the  
 276 statement and also there was not much different from the responses of people who hadn't  
 277 defaulted MF group loans. Most of them also agreed and strongly agreed with the statement.  
 278 The majority of all respondents were neutral about the *support of members of the loan group*  
 279 *for them to manage credit*. However, the majority of the respondents who had defaulted  
 280 disagreed with the statement that the loan group supported them to manage credit. Most of  
 281 those who hadn't defaulted MF group loans were neutral on the above statement, which  
 282 affects the overall result. Overall, the result depicted that the majority of respondents  
 283 strongly agreed which indicates *group members encouraged them to pay their instalments*  
 284 *on the due date*. However, most of the respondents who had defaulted MF group loans were  
 285 neutral about this statement while the respondents who hadn't defaulted MF group loans  
 286 strongly agreed with this statement.

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#### 4.5 Macroeconomic factors (ECO)

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A total of four statements was assumed to measure the macroeconomic impact construct in this study. Factor analysis revealed a one-factor solution, with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.580, which is approximately 0.6 (acceptable) and confirming that these statements were reliable measures of ECO. The KMO value was 0.557 and p-value of Bartlett's test of Sphericity (Chi-square=74.3995, df= 6) was significant (P< 0.05). In summary, these four statements explained 45.95% of the variance of ECO (Table 3).

**Table 3: Explanatory factor analysis for ECO**

| Item label | Statement  | Factor loading | Cronbach's alpha | % variance |
|------------|--|----------------|------------------|------------|
| ECO2       | Depreciation of the rupee against the USD, have adversely affected to the ability of my loan repayment | 0.871          | 0.580            | 45.95      |

|      |   |       |  |  |
|------|---|-------|--|--|
| ECO1 | Inflation is adversely affecting the ability to repay my loan.  | 0.753 |  |  |
| ECO4 | Political instability of the country and village level, adversely affecting to the ability of my loan repayment | 0.668 |  |  |
| ECO3 | Frequent weather changes and natural disasters adversely affect my ability to repay my loan.                    | 0.419 |  |  |

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298 Annexure 1 shows that most of the respondents thought *the inflation effect on our economy*  
299 *adversely affect ability to repay their loan*. The majority of e respondents who had defaulted  
300 MF group loans strongly agreed with the above statement. Most of the respondents who  
301 hadn't defaulted MF group loans also agreed and strongly agreed with the above. Most of  
302 the respondents were neutral about the *effect of depreciation of foreign exchange rate on*  
303 *their ability to repay loans*. Most of the respondents who had defaulted MF group loans  
304 agreed that depreciation of the foreign exchange rate adversely affected their ability to repay  
305 their loans. However, according to the responses of the majority of those who hadn't  
306 defaulted MF group loans were neutral about the statement. Overall, the majority of  
307 respondents strongly agreed that frequent *weather changes and natural disasters adversely*  
308 *affecting their ability to repay*. Most of those who had defaulted strongly agreed with the  
309 statement. The majority of those who hadn't defaulted also agreed with the above statement.  
310 According to the overall result, most of them were neutral or agreed about the *political*  
311 *instability at the country and village level adversely affecting their ability to repay*. The  
312 majority of respondents who had defaulted MF group loans agreed with the statement while  
313 the majority of respondents who hadn't defaulted MF group loans were neutral.

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## 315 5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

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317 The main objective of this study was to identify and analyze the factors influencing MF loan  
318 default in Sri Lanka. After analyzing the collected data, the conceptual framework was  
319 changed after the factor analysis. MF institutes and their strategies were loaded into two  
320 factors: "Loan granting procedure" and "Customer services". Family influence was loaded  
321 into a single factor as expected earlier whereas statements included in the macroeconomy  
322 were loaded into a single factor. Furthermore, none of the statements was removed from the  
323 whole data set as each statement in the three constructs was supported by each construct.

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326 In the factor loading results sheet, the MFI2 statement makes the highest contribution. This  
327 statement looks at the on-loan size approved by the MF institute according to the borrower's  
328 perspective. Balogun [15] stated that loan shortfall or inadequate loan size highly affects  
329 loan default. The results of this study confirmed that most of the respondents had defaulted  
330 due to inadequate loan size. However, respondents who had not defaulted accepted the  
331 loan size offered by MFIs. These results indicate that defaulted loan holders try to obtain  
332 loans irrespective of the amount of the loan as a matter of habit. This also again adversely  
333 affects the repayment performance.

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Results of the study showed that MF loans were granted at the right time they expected.  
Olomola [14] emphasized that delays in loan delivery significantly impacts on loan



342 repayment ability. However, borrowers in default did not agree with the statement. It seems  
343 they were applying for a loan for urgent and not for the well-planned projects or income  
344 generation. Without taking reasonable time to grant a loan causes a negative impact on the  
345 profitability of MFIs. But too much delay to deliver may cause borrowers to default.  
346 Sheila [16] stated that inadequate financial analysis is another cause of microfinance loan  
347 default. Our study showed that both defaulting and non-defaulting borrowers agree on the  
348 estimation of the total debt of borrowers. It is vital to identify the ability to repay and avoid the  
349 risk of loan default.

350 In factor loading this statement leads to the construct making the highest contribution. The  
351 statement aims to look at how borrowers perceive installment methods suggested by the M  
352 F institute. According to the study, the majority of respondents mentioned that the installment  
353 method was not an easy and simple method. This fact was confirmed by Kohansal [17] who  
354 also indicated that the number of installments had a negative effect on repayment. However,  
355 microfinance officers personally visit and collect weekly and bi-weekly installments in order  
356 to mitigate default risk. But it does seem to be an easy task for borrowers to repay their  
357 loans.

358  
359 The literature highlights poor loan supervision as the major cause of loan default [15]. This  
360 was also confirmed by the results of this study. Without a training and knowledge of loan  
361 management, the MF institute cannot expect their borrowers to repay their loans on time.  
362 Therefore, to minimize the loan default risk MFIs need to do proper supervision.

363  
364 A loan instalment consists of both principal and interest. The problem here is that the  
365 borrowers are not going to find out how much of interest is charged by the institute  
366 compared to other MF institutes. However, the results of the study showed that the interest  
367 rate of the MF institute of the customer's choice is not attractive. Hence, this means MFIs  
368 charge high interest on their MF loans. Okpugie [24] and Vandel [25] also emphasized that  
369 the high-interest rate charged by most MFIs was the reason behind loan default. Borrowers  
370 have to pay more than what they have to usually pay. Ultimately, this adversely affects the  
371 loan repayment performance of the borrowers as well as the healthy loan portfolio of the  
372 MFIs.

### 373 374 **5.1 Family Influence**

375  
376 Factor loading of F2 leads the construct to make the highest contribution. The statement was  
377 developed to identify the support of family members to repay loans. Without the support and  
378 help of family members, borrowers cannot repay their loans on time. MFIs can avoid this  
379 problem of loan delinquency by taking action to enhance the borrower's family  
380 cohesiveness; the results confirmed that this aspect directly affects the borrowers'  
381 repayment ability.

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383 Family income (F1) also has a considerable impact on loan repayment performance.  
384 Kohansal [17] highlighted that the income of farmers has a positive effect on loan  
385 repayment. This study also confirmed that the family income of borrowers is sufficient to  
386 settle remaining loans and debt without obtaining new loans. MFIs especially need to  
387 disburse credit to borrowers engaged in income generation activities to mitigate the risk of  
388 default.

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390 Today, almost MF loans disbursed among borrowers are based on the group loaning  
391 mechanism as collateral. This statement was constructed to know how group members  
392 contribute to the payment on instalments on the due date. This result indicated that  
393 members of the group encouraged borrowers to repay their loans without delay. It seems  
394 that they try to mitigate default themselves, as stated by Besley [19].

395  
396 Most of the time group members interact with each other until they obtain loans. Afterwards,  
397 they do not discuss how to manage their loans. Thus, this statement looks at the support of  
398 group members to manage their credit. The study revealed that borrowers in previous  
399 default do not have the support of members to manage credit. It may have a significant  
400 impact on repayment performances. Therefore, interaction among group members is vital to  
401 minimize the risk of default.

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## 403 **5.2 Macroeconomic factors**

404 In factor loading, ECO2 leads the construct by making the highest contribution. According to  
405 Kwakwa [20], depreciation of the foreign exchange rate directly affected the loan repayment  
406 ability of the borrowers. The statement looks at how exchange rate depreciation impacts on  
407 loan repayment. The study showed that most borrowers were not aware of the foreign  
408 exchange rate and therefore their responses were neutral. However, defaulting borrowers  
409 mentioned that the foreign exchange rate deprecation only negatively impacted on their  
410 repayment performance.

411 Price levels in the country increase day by day threatening the living status of the people,  
412 especially low and middle-level income families. If they have to pay more for goods and  
413 services, purchasing power declines. Also, repayment ability diminishes. Thus, the  
414 statement was meant to understand the impact of inflation on the repayment performance of  
415 loan holders. As illustrated by Waweru [18], inflation reduces purchasing power and the  
416 result of the study also showed a negative impact on loan repayment performance.

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418 According to Fofack [21], macro-economic stability diminishes the level of loan default. The  
419 statement was designed to look at how political instability in the country affects repayment  
420 performance. The study revealed that political instability in the country and at village level  
421 has not much of an impact on loan default. It seems that the repayment performance of  
422 borrowers does not depend on political parties or their actions.

423

424 Sri Lanka, as well as the Matugama region, has to face frequent weather changes and  
425 natural disasters. Consequently, the study especially focused on weather and natural  
426 disasters. The majority of respondents who either defaulted or did not default on loans  
427 agreed with the statement which referred to frequent weather changes and natural disasters  
428 adversely affected the ability to repay loans. It appears that people are highly involved in  
429 activities affected by weather changes and natural disasters.

430

431 This study contributes to the knowledge of microfinance even though the subject has been  
432 well explored qualitatively by ample research. MF is a mature field now and loan default has  
433 become an emerging issue. The quantitative model developed by the researcher can in  
434 future be expanded with a much larger sample. In this study, the researcher developed  
435 some variables and factors that influence loan defaults in a developing country in the South  
436 Asian region. Therefore, emerging economies and future researchers can use this as a  
437 base.

438 Managers of MFIs can identify the most important factors affecting loan default with  
439 reference to the perspectives of the borrowers. According to the findings and results of the  
440 study, there are many borrowers who have already defaulted on loan repayments but obtain  
441 new loans from different institutes. Before granting a loan, a proper appraisal process should  
442 be conducted by the MFI's loan officers. MFIs should follow clear and effective credit or  
443 lending policies and procedures and must be regularly reviewed. The results of this study  
444 suggest that managers explore new customer bases rather than searching for and offering  
445 loans to existing customers in the interests of risk management, which means mature  
446 borrowers, are not guilty of serious default issues because they know that group members  
447 may repay on their behalf if they are in arrears. The formation of strong solidarity groups is a

448 possible remedy for high default and MFIs must supervise and review each and every loan  
449 borrower while providing training and workshops for better performance. Otherwise, they  
450 obtain loans for different purposes and cause trouble with repayment. Loans should be  
451 granted to people involved in income generation activities. The results of this study confirm  
452 that most of MF loans are for the purpose of settling other loans, which means their  
453 repayment ability is very low.

454 Governing bodies and policy makers can take action to minimize the risk of loan default of  
455 the MF sector. The government should endeavor to ensure their success and wealth by  
456 formulating policies that create a favorable environment for businesses and financial  
457 institutions to operate. Regulatory authorities should take action to control MFIs in order to  
458 create a favourable business environment, especially a favourable interest rate mechanism  
459 and workshops for credit management. Also, policymakers and regulatory officials should  
460 prepare standards and minimum requirements for granting MF loans a second time. The  
461 intention of borrowers who have already defaulted on loan repayments is to obtain loans at  
462 any time at any cost from anywhere. Furthermore, the study reveals that loan holders who  
463 are already in default have obtained loans again. This is a serious issue of default in the Sri  
464 Lankan context. Therefore, this study suggests that policy holders and regulatory bodies like  
465 the Central Bank to grant access to the CRIB report for formal MFIs to avoid loan  
466 delinquency.

467 Despite the contributions of this study, as listed above, there are certain limitations that need  
468 to be noted. A paper-based questionnaire fails to gather qualitative information such as inner  
469 feelings and perceptions of respondents about the hidden reasons behind loan default with  
470 MF institutions in Sri Lanka. Therefore, future researchers could use longitudinal research to  
471 understand the changes in borrowers' perceptions and behaviours as well as MFIs'  
472 perceptions over time. Data was collected from only from loan borrowers. Other  
473 stakeholders such as MFI managers, executives, family members of loan borrowers and  
474 group members can help to understand the true picture about loan defaults. Hence, future  
475 researchers could consider data collection from a diverse pool of respondents to receive  
476 better results and to develop a model that explains factors influencing loan default in Sri  
477 Lanka.

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479

## 480 **COMPETING INTERESTS**

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482

483 **AUTHORS HAVE DECLARED THAT NO COMPETING INTERESTS EXIST**

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 557 **APPENDIX**

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Table I: Summary of Mean and SD for each of the statement in the questionnaire

| Item label | Micro finance institutional factors   | Mean        | Std. Deviation |
|------------|---|-------------|----------------|
| MF11       | The Interest rate of the MF institute of my choice is attractive than the other institute                     | 2.92        | 1.271          |
| MF12       | MF Institute has approved adequate advance/ loan  | 3.51        | 1.132          |
| MF13       | The loan was granted at the right time I was expecting  | 3.55        | 1.055          |
| MF14       | I am satisfied with the procedures that MF institute followed to approve the loan                             | 3.23        | 1.193          |
| MF15       | When I was applying the loan, MF institute estimated my total debt  | 3.57        | .932           |
| MF16       | MF institute suggested to me a simple and easy installment payment method                                     | 3.19        | 1.194          |
| MF17       | MF institute arranged workshops, technical instructions and financial knowledge, after they granted me a loan | 1.89        | .987           |
|            | <b>Average</b>  | <b>3.12</b> | <b>1.109</b>   |
| F1         | I think, my total family income is sufficient to settle future total debt.                                    | 3.55        | 1.177          |
| F2         | My family members help me to settle the loans.  | 3.70        | 1.161          |
| F3         | Members of the loan group support me to manage the credit.  | 2.92        | 1.122          |
| F4         | My group members encourage me to pay the loan installments on the due date.                                   | 4.05        | .960           |
|            | <b>Average</b>  | <b>3.56</b> | <b>1.105</b>   |
| ECO1       | Inflation is adversely affecting the ability to repay my loan.  | 3.96        | 1.157          |
| ECO2       | Depreciation of the rupee against the USD, have adversely affected to the ability of my loan repayment        | 3.11        | .994           |
| ECO3       | Frequent weather changes and natural disasters adversely affect my ability to repay my loan.                  | 4.02        | .961           |

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|------|---|-------------|--------------|
| ECO4 | Political instability of the country and village level, adversely affecting to the ability of my loan repayment | 2.88        | 1.181        |
|      | <b>Average</b>  | <b>3.49</b> | <b>1.073</b> |

UNDER PEER REVIEW